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Abstract

Headhunting
Evaluating the Disruptive Capacity of Leadership Decapitation on Terrorist Organizations
by
Ted Clemens IV

Advisor: Professor Peter Liberman

What are the circumstances that allow a decapitation strike to be optimally effective in
destabilising a terrorist group? What effect does decapitation have on the terrorist groups that
experience them? Is there a causal correlation between the type of terror group experiencing
decapitation and a typology of effects? Analysts and scholars alike are rightly skeptical of the
viability of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism strategy. However, the efficacy of
decapitation has less to do with whether it is uniformly implemented as a counter-terrorism
mechanism and more to do with the conditions, timing, structure, and aims of the extremist
group in question.

Based on the review of several terrorist groups that vary in age, size, active region, message,
and internal structure, I argue that the younger a group is, the more hierarchical its structure,
and those groups that relied purely on ideology or religious oppression to sustain activity were
several times more vulnerable to degradation or disintegration from leadership removal. To this
end, I posit that terrorist organizations can also experience a correlative typology of effects,
post-decapitation. This suggests that policy-makers and scholarship would benefit from a less
binary view on the usage of decapitation and its effectiveness. Rather, like all strategic options,
targeted killings or arrests of militant leadership should be weighed against other appropriate
stratagem and only implemented under the favorable conditions in order to maximize the
potential outcome.
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Headhunting
Evaluating the Disruptive Capacity of Leadership Decapitation on Terrorist
Organizations
David ran, and stood upon the Philistine, and took his sword, and drew it out of the sheath
thereof, and slew him, and cut off his head. And when the Philistines saw their champion
was dead, they scattered.1
1 Samuel; Chapter 17: 51
Introduction

Is leadership decapitation by arrest or assassination sufficient to collapse a terrorist
organization? What are the conditions that are most suited to decapitation's success? What are
the effects of leadership decapitation? Is there a typology of effects correlative to the attributes
of different terror groups? What pronouncements can policy-makers issue on the future use of a
targeted killings or arrests? No assassination has captured public attention and perpetuated
popular interest during the twenty-first century like that of Usama bin Ladin in the early summer
of 2011. Americans in particular were fascinated by the final months of al-Qa’ida's, once prolific
Senior Operations Chief and self-proclaimed emir. Articles, novels, televised interviews,
documentaries, and major motion pictures, all mirrored the interest in the targeted killing and
disposal of America's 'highest value target'2.

Midnight celebrations on Pennsylvania Avenue and the streets of New York City marked
the somewhat morbid satisfaction felt by the U.S. public in the immediate aftermath of bin
Ladin's death. Media reports that the now-deceased leader had been viewing videotapes of
pornography – which, in actuality, contained operational information and instructions for
potential terrorist activity – in his final months, circulated as citizens as well as the United States
government waited to see what immediate repercussions his assassination would have for
subsequent counterterrorism efforts. Yet, what has Usama bin Ladin's death over a decade
after the attacks of September the 11th yielded in terms of culling al-Qa’ida the organization?
Were we removing an immediate threat to American interests, or were we out for revenge?
More importantly still, what can this instance of targeted killing tell scholarship and researchers
about the ramifications of leadership decapitation in terror groups?
1
2

1 Sam. 17: 51 KJV.
"The FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists." FBI. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 2001–May 2011. Web.
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Targeting the leadership of terrorist organizations has become a critical goal of the
counter-terrorism policies of several countries, including the State of Israel, the United Kingdom
and the United States, to name a few. In spite of the reluctance of states to overtly admit that
terrorist leadership are explicitly targeted, because of the legal dubiousness of targeted strikes,
the rhetoric of the White House makes clear that leaders are more often than not the targets of
counter-terrorism campaigns. President Bush’s 2006 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, spoke to the importance of removing the leadership of terrorist groups in order to
impede future acts of terror:

Leaders, who provide the vision that followers strive to realize. They also
offer the necessary direction, discipline, and motivation for accomplishing a
given goal or task. Most terrorist organizations have a central figure who
embodies the cause, in addition to several operational leaders and managers
who provide guidance on a functional, regional, or local basis. The loss of a
leader can degrade a group’s cohesiveness and in some cases may trigger
its collapse.

The Obama administration seems to view leadership decapitation as being part of an effectual,
grand counter-terrorism strategy; President Obama stated in a 2011, White House brief that
leadership extrication was a mark of the coalition’s success against terrorism.

In the past two and a half years, we have eliminated more key al-Qa’ida
leaders in rapid succession than at any time since September 11, 2001,
including Usama bin Laden, the only leader that al-Qa’ida had ever known.
As a result we now have the opportunity to seize a turning point in our effort
to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qa’ida.

Regardless of the lack of consensus on the part of scholarship as to whether decapitation is
effective, or even counterproductive, it is clearly a symbolic if not prudent choice for those
nations that employ it and will be into the foreseeable future.
A significant amount of the research conducted on decapitation strategy in the years
subsequent to 9/11 would seem to suggest that targeted killings and arrests are insufficient to
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derail a terrorist organization (Mannes, 2008, Cronin, 2009, Hafez & Hatfield, 2006, Jordan,
2009 & 2014, Langdon et al., 2004, Boaz, 2005) . Robert Pape, in both Dying to Win and
Bombing to Win, maintains that targeting enemy leaders ‘has never been effective’3 to halt
terrorist activity and that policies of decapitation ‘have met with meager success’4. Jenna Jordan
suggests that the ‘marginal utility’ of leadership decapitation is ‘actually negative’5. The divide
between state implementation of decapitation strategy, even as a broader part of a counterterrorism strategy, and the reticence of scholarship to embrace it illustrate, if anything, that any
conclusions gleaned from decapitation research thus far are preliminary at best.

This paper argues that in spite of the lack of consensus, there are certain conditions that
increase the likelihood that leadership decapitation will result in group degradation or death:
namely the the operational age of the group, its design structure, and its core motivation for
carrying out attacks point to the group’s susceptibility to organizational death by means of
decapitation. I support the argument that (a) groups that have existed for twenty years or longer
will be generally less susceptible to leadership decapitation, while younger ones may unravel or
become operationally stagnant. I also further the argument that (b) groups with hierarchically
structuring, who are dependent on their leadership are more susceptible to organizational death
after leadership has been removed, while groups whose leadership is not formalized,
centralized or does not require leadership to act, will be less vulnerable. Lastly, I reaffirm that (c)
groups motivated by nationalism or separatism are uniquely difficult to curb, while religious and
ideological groups are often susceptible to decapitation when their values or beliefs are
undercut by law enforcement or dwindling, popular support. The more of these factors that
aggregate within a specific terrorist group also contribute to the likelihood that the group will
suffer organizational degradation or collapse.

My contribution to the leadership decapitation literature is the presence and maturation
of particular, effects that are correlative with the type of terrorist group that experiences
leadership decapitation. Much has been said and written about whether or not leadership
decapitation is an efficacious strategy for its desired outcome, however, little examination of the
specific after-effects of decapitation has been conducted by scholarship. Further, those who do
look to the aftermath of decapitation for making pronouncements on the strategy’s
3

Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power & Coercion in War. p. 316.
Pape, Robert A. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. p. 14.
5
Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation.". p. 720.
4
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effectiveness, often only regard the operational continuation or cessation of terrorist activities as
measures of success and failure. Instead, I argue that given the varied typology and objectives
of terrorist groups, success and failure cannot be accurately be measured in such narrow
parameters. Rather, through analysis of the aftermath of decapitation on the type of groups
stated above, I argue that the success and failure of leadership decapitation occupy a vast,
subjective grey area.

I test the hypothesis that there are causally correlative effects, engendered by leadership
decapitation, and linked to a specific typology of terrorist group. That is, (a) When hierarchically
structured groups experience leadership decapitation, they either seek to rebrand themselves in
a grasp for legitimacy (e.g. name a successor with less violent aspirations, look for political
recognition, reorient themselves as community-based organizations, or all of the
aforementioned) or face organizational collapse. (b) When religious or ideological groups are
targeted by authorities they enter a ‘spiral of amplification’ which leads to increased violence on
the part of the group. Targeting the group causes a supernova-like effect, whereby a group
increases the number and/or severity of attacks in the correct assumption that they are nearing
organizational collapse, before in effect, dissolving. (c) When religious homogeneity and
interests of nationality (i.e. cultural cleavages) aggregate, the potential for acts of terrorism –
especially suicide terrorism – increases, and with it, the likelihood that leadership decapitation
will be ineffectual.
Issues in my research include varying definitions of ‘operational success’ in measuring
the success of decapitation, a terrorist organization’s ability or perceived necessity in successor
naming , and the examination of decapitation solely on a case by case basis which make
effective comparisons among groups largely generalizing. Yet, so long as decapitation remains
a consistently utilized tool in the counter-terrorism repertoire of many states; it may serve
researchers and policy-makers to better observe the circumstances under which decapitation is
most likely to yield favorable results.

Data & Methodology

Along with a review of previous, scholarly work on leadership decapitation, and
government agency reports, I will utilize statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) as data sets provided by START. I make use of the GTD generated chart primarily
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because of the criteria for ‘terrorism’ that it imposes. Acts of terrorism ‘must be aimed at
attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal’6. The search parameters also require
that there is verifiable evidence of an intention to ‘coerce, intimidate, or convey some other
message to a larger audience(s) than the immediate victims’ and that the incident occurred
outside of the ‘context of legitimate warfare activities’ – i.e. not within the recognizable or
permitted actions of international humanitarian law, the laws of armed conflict, and all laws
therein regarding the ‘admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants’.
These highly specific criteria – in my view – compound the reliability of the data generated by
the GTD’s advanced search, and thus allow for more intelligible conclusions to be drawn.

I make use of the GTD to compile verified incidents of terrorism from the date of
decapitation up to two years from the time of leadership decapitation, as well as specifying the
method of attack (e.g. suicide or non-suicide attack, biological weapon, bombing or explosion,
etc.). Once the chart representative of the data is generated, I follow up each data set with an
evaluation of the results, controlling for other potential factors that may influence the data’s
results.

The structure of the paper proceeds as follows: First, I provide a brief outline of the
arguments for and against leadership decapitation. These sections examine, primarily, the
efficacy or inefficacy of leadership decapitation, however, some of the authors who are reviewed
provide secondary advantages and disadvantages to the practice (e.g. legality, popular support,
etc.) which are also mentioned here. I proceed by conducting a concise review of the literary
and academic source I reference throughout my paper. These reviews are divided by their
support or opposition to the efficacy of the practice of leadership decapitation.

Third, I distill from the sources examined what I hold to be the three fundamental,
determining factors that contribute to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of leadership
decapitation in terrorist groups – these factors being, the age, structure, and internal motivation
of the groups themselves. I suggest, as many scholars have similarly, the strengths and
weaknesses of age as a factor in determining the outcome of decapitation strikes. Next, I lay out
the reasoning behind the assertion that groups that are structured hierarchically are more
vulnerable to decapitation than horizontally structured groups where leadership is unclear.

6

Global Terrorism Database. START, 2015. Web.
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Lastly, I discuss the factors implicit in the assertion that motivation of terrorist groups also plays
a role in whether or not they are sensitive to leadership decapitation.

Fourth, I examine several case studies of terrorist organizations that have experienced
one or more episodes of leadership removal and I apply the criteria of age, structure, and
internal motivation to discern the degree of their impact on the ultimate outcome of each
instance of decapitation. The case studies include; Abimael Guzman and Shining Path, Usama
bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida, Abdurajak and Khadaffy Janjalani and the Abu Sayyaf Group, Velupillai
Prabhakaran and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo, Dokko Umarov and the Caucasus Emirate,
and Yahya Ayyash and Hamas.

Fifth, I present my conclusions on the case studies examined, the degree to which they
comport with or contradict the suggestions of the scholars I reference, and my thoughts as to
why decapitation was ultimately effective or ineffectual in bringing about organizational
dissolution or death. Further, I include a brief section on the relevant policy implications that I
maintain emerged from my research.

Definitions
As Stephanie Carvin readily admits, ‘there is no consensus as to what the term
[leadership decapitation] actually means or how it should be defined’7. She points to instances
of scholarship using the term ‘decapitation’ as referring to ‘assassination’8 or ‘targeted killing’9.
For the purposes of this paper however, leadership decapitation will broadly refer to the
intentional, direct arrest or killing of an individual due to their discernable membership – and
perceived leadership – of a terrorist organization. Definitions of ‘terrorist leadership’ can be
understood as referring to either the foremost leader of a terrorist organization or any member
within the upper ranks of the organization who holds a position of authority. Finally, for purposes
of assessing the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of a decapitation operation, this paper defines ‘operational
success’ as whether or not a terrorist organization was operationally inactive for two years
7

Carvin, Stephanie. "The Trouble with Targeted Killing." .p. 2.
Mannes, Aaron. "Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's
Activity?" The Journal of International Policy Solutions IX (2008): 40-49. Print.
9
Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation."Security Studies 18
(2009): 719-55. Print., Price, Bryan C. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to
Counterterrorism." International Security 36.IV (2012): 9-46. Print., Dear, Keith Patrick. "Beheading the Hydra? Does
Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work?" Defence Studies XIII.3 (2013): 293-337. Print.
8
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following the incident of decapitation. A two year period of inactivity is designated by the U.S.
State Department for declaring a Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) operationally inactive,
making it a viable benchmark against which to gauge my research10.
Arguments for Leadership Decapitation
Scholars and counterterrorism analysts who are advocates of leadership decapitation
view even a marginal utility to the strategy as proof that it is a policy path worth pursuing.
However, none among decapitation’s supporters would or do suggest that targeted killing or
arrest of terrorist leadership is an efficacious, stand-alone strategy. Rather, they view it as one
tool in a repertoire of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency stratagem. For proponents, the
stated goals of leadership decapitation are effective on their face in that the strategy
accomplishes no less than what it suggests – the removal of leadership from its position of
authority or ability to influence operations. The immediate effect of leadership decapitation is
fundamentally that the leader is no longer in a position to provide the group with the tools that
had made them an effective leader, advocates of the practice contend. In so doing, a group can
be deprived of skilled personnel with explosives expertise, a charismatic individual with
galvanizing potential, a figure of religious authority, or perhaps a combination of several of the
aforementioned abilities who is not readily replaceable. Patrick Dear succinctly states this
benefit in saying ‘targeted killing aims ultimately to reduce the number and lethality of insurgent
attacks’11. Leadership decapitation, advocates suggest, offers a plausible, short-term, means of
achieving this.
Daniel Byman suggests that ‘the number of skilled terrorists is...limited. Bomb makers,
terrorist trainers, forgers, recruiters, and terrorist leaders are scarce’12. Moreover, finding a
competent replacement for a predecessor can prove a difficult task when a terrorist group is
ducking counterterrorism measures designed to keep the group in a defensive posture. Robert
Pape, who has suggested that removing leadership is not an effective military strategy, admits
in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism that terrorist groups are forced to
consider the prospect of a ‘limited human capital’ with regards to sacrificing personnel13.
Although Pape uses the term in reference to a limited number of suicide bombers, the same
10

"Bureau of Counterterrorism." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 1 June 2015. Web.
Dear, Keith Patrick. "Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work?" Defence Studies
XIII.3 (2013): p 300. Print.
12
Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?" Foreign Affairs. 85.2 (2006): p 103. Print.
13
Pape, Robert Anthony. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. p.
11
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logic applies to leadership. Similarly, Bryan Price contends that leadership decapitation is
ultimately an effective policy because of the nature of terrorist groups themselves. Price argues
that because of the organizational structure of terrorist groups as ‘clandestine, values-based,
and violent,’ these factors ‘amplify the importance of leaders’ and subsequently makes
leadership succession more difficult. With new leadership hard to find, terrorist groups can
‘attract recruits, but lacking expertise, these new recruits will not pose the same kind of threat’
according to Byman14.

Proponents of leadership decapitation also argue several secondary benefits to the
strategy. Stephanie Carvin suggests that ‘the most important of these benefits is the idea that
[leadership decapitation] disrupts terrorist organizations, throwing them into chaos and
preventing them from planning future attacks’15. This period of chaos in which terrorist
organizations are not necessarily ‘dead’ but operationally inactive allows more long-term,
counterterrorism operations to take effect, advocates of the policy argue. ‘To avoid elimination,
the terrorists must constantly change locations, keep those locations secret, and keep their
heads down, all of which reduces the flow of information in their organization and makes internal
communications problematic and dangerous’, Byman writes16. Steven David makes a similar
point in succinctly remarking that ‘targeting killing also keeps potential bombers and bomb
makers on the run’ 17. The leaders of terrorist organizations are often responsible for
maintaining these components of their organization, hence, in their absence, remaining
clandestine becomes all the more arduous. Patrick Dear echoes the importance of disorienting
and dislodging terrorist groups from their places of safety through leadership decapitation. Dear
writes, ‘in the short term [leadership decapitation] disrupts planning by forcing remaining leaders
to reduce meetings with others, avoid traceable communication devices, move often, and to
trust caution to avoid detection and reduce their vulnerability’18.

Remaining in the shadows too has its drawbacks for terrorist organizations. Familiars
such as friends, family, and associates all become sources of constraint, whereby attempting
contact one could be tantamount to assuring one’s own capture or death. Byman contends that
14

Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?". p 95-111.

15

Carvin, Stephanie. "The Trouble with Targeted Killing." .p 3.
Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?". p 104.
17
David, Steven R. "Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing." Ethics & International Affairs Ethics Int. Aff. (2003): p 120.
Web.
18
Dear, Keith Patrick. "Beheading the Hydra". p 298.
16
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these stressors aggregate, so that 'operatives cannot visit their parents or children without
risking death' 19. The excessive precautions necessary to maintaining clandestine status amidst
counterterrorism measures designed to unseat you by its very nature drains terrorists of the
resources, time, and stability necessary to planning subsequent terrorist acts. In this regard,
disrupting terrorist behavior through leadership decapitation is a notable advantage.

For advocates, the proportionality of leadership decapitation and the relative ease and
simplicity with which it can be executed provides an added benefit to the strategy. In lieu of
lengthy and expensive invasions or occupations – which have the added worry of potential
nation-building in their aftermath – leadership decapitation is cost-effective. Steven David in
Fatal Choices, notes that ‘targeted killings do not ‘employ large numbers of troops, bombers,
artillery and other means that can cause far more destruction than they prevent’ 20. When
considering this, one is forced to acknowledge that highly targeted, aerial strikes, or a team of
military operators is far more proportional than a major incursion.
David again contends in Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing, that ‘Targeted killing is
discriminatory in that it focuses exclusively on one’s adversaries. Civilian casualties and
collateral damage are minimized. It is proportionate in that only enough force is used to
accomplish the task’ 21. Minimizing collateral and civilian casualties also means maintaining
international and IGO coalition support for such policies, as well as domestic support. In terms
of cost-effectiveness, Johnston in The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Combating
Insurgencies contends that removing a top insurgent leader increased the chances of
terminating costly campaigns in the year following the leader’s removal by roughly twenty-five
percent22. Johnston adds that while this says little about the outcome of the decapitation
campaign itself, it does imply averting the substantial costs of future efforts to counter terrorism.

The focused nature of targeted killings is in itself a benefit noted by many of its
advocates as a justification of its continued usage. Under the rationale of its proponents, the
narrow focus of targeted killings minimizes civilian deaths and collateral damage.
Counterintuitive as it may seem, Carvin suggests that the use of targeted killing as a
19

Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?". p 104.
David, Steven R. "Fatal Choices". p 121.
21
David, Steven R. "Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing". p 17.
22
Johnston, Patrick B. "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in
Counterinsurgency Campaigns." International Security 36.4 (2012): 47-79. Print.
20
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counterterrorism strategy ‘actually saves lives’23. The threat of death acts as a deterrent factor
for potential terrorists, at the very least giving them pause. David Rohde, a journalist for the New
York Times who was kidnapped by Taliban affiliates in 2008, noted that the audible sound of
drones overhead instilled the fear of death in his captors. The Taliban kidnappers did not come
outside during the day and did not amass in groups for fear of being seen or killed24.

Or, as David argues, many terrorists would rather be captured alive than killed in the
field. He writes, 'when the Israelis informed the [Palestinian Authority] whom they were after this
information was often passed to the targeted individuals so that they knew they were being
hunted. Some voluntarily chose to place themselves in custody to avoid being slain 25. For
detractors of leadership decapitation who argue against the legality of assassination, this
potential benefit not only spares the lives of civilians, but also of the terrorists themselves. Price
discusses the consequences of when terrorists turn themselves into the authorities. He remarks
that even ‘capturing, or capturing then killing the leader – significantly increase[s] the mortality
rate of terrorist groups’ 26. Terrorist leadership does not need to be killed in order to be rendered
ineffective.

Often, the reality of targeting leadership for assassination or capture means that the
latter is highly improbable. Still, it is possible that an excessively perilous operation to
apprehend terrorist leadership could inadvertently result in the death of the individual or
individuals, and further endanger the lives of the operatives conducting the mission. Under
these circumstances, targeted killing as a method of leadership decapitation is pragmatic if not
the only viable option. For Amitai Etzioni, ensuring ‘security requires preventing attacks rather
than prosecuting the perpetrators after the attack’. He contends that endangering the lives of
soldiers or operatives in order to subject terrorists to the rule of law is not a rational response for
‘terrorists who are willing to commit suicide during their attack...and who will pay no mind to
what might be done to them after their assault’. Still, for those heavily invested in the cause for

23

Carvin, Stephanie. "The Trouble with Targeted Killing." .p 3.
Rohde, David. "How Obama’s Drone War Is Backfiring." Reuters: U.S. Reuters, 2012. Web. 12 Oct. 2015.
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David, Steven R. "Fatal Choices". p 120.
26
Price, Bryan C. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism."
International Security 36.IV (2012): p 44. Print.
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which utilizing terrorism as a means to an end, Etzioni argues that they are ‘prepared to proceed
despite whatever punishments the legal system may throw at them’ 27.

In this limited regard, assassination is a preferable method of leadership decapitation.
For terrorists who are in hiding, exile, or protected by states who may alert them to international
counterterrorism operations targeting them, targeted assassination as a form of leadership
decapitation is the most effective way in which to prevent a specific leader from continuing to
plan attacks. Using the model of Pakistan and al-Qa’ida, Byman suggests that detaining
terrorists in the Federated Tribal Regions ‘is almost impossible today; the Pakistani government
does not control many of the areas where al Qaeda is based, and a raid to seize terrorists there
would probably end in the militants escaping and U.S. and allied casualties in the attempt’ 28.

Literature Review
Daniel Byman’s Do Targeted Killings Work?, as well as Steven David’s Fatal Choices
and Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing are foremost concerned with leadership decapitation’s
benefits as they pertain to targeted assassination. More specifically, the two are focused on
Israel’s policy of targeted killing and measuring its success against Hamas. Both authors utilize
data gathered from the First and Second Intifadas, given that the latter produced Israel’s
counter-measure of targeted killing. In this sense, the scope of their empirical and quantitative
data as well subsequent assessments of leadership decapitation are rather limited in providing a
temporally long, stream of data from which to make pronouncements about potential aftereffects. Similarly, the effects of observing the repercussions of targeted killing exclusively will
yield different results from those that also compare arrest records with targeted assassinations.
Byman’s somewhat sanguine assessment of Israel’s assassination campaign after the
Second Intifada appears to stem from the statistics on Israeli death tolls between 2002 and
2005. He cites a National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) figure that
quotes Israeli deaths as a result of terrorism at approximately 185 in 2002. However, the
number of dead decreased to 45 in 2003, 67 in 2004, and 21 in 2005. Separate data from the
MIPT also suggests that while the number and frequency of terrorist incidents attributed to

27

Etzioni, Amitai. "Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Moral and Legal Case." Joint Force Quarterly 57 (2010): p 68,
69. Web.
28
Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?" p. 107.
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Hamas rose between 2001 to 2005 – by an 842% increase – the efficiency and number of
casualties did not increase29. Byman suggests that:

as the number of attacks grew, the number of Israeli deaths...plunged,
suggesting that the attacks themselves became far less effective. The
lethality rate rose from 3.9 deaths per attack in 2001 to 5.4 in 2002. Then,
in 2003 the rate began to fall, dropping to 0.98 deaths per attack that
year, 0.33 in 2004, and 0.11 in 2005. 30
Byman’s research highlights the apparent success of leadership decapitation in the case of
Israel and Palestinian-borne, terrorist activity. According to Byman, the mere fact that there are
less successful attacks points to a lack of coordination among terrorists, which in turn decreases
the efficiency of future attacks. While the scale of Byman’s study is comparatively, quantitatively
small to other studies such as Jenna Jordan’s – where nearly 300 episodes of decapitation are
analyzed over a 60 year period – his postulation that ‘something more than correlation was at
work here’ bears out31.
Steven David’s assessments of the Israeli targeted killing campaign draw more tentative
conclusions than those espoused by Byman. David contends, as many proponents of
leadership decapitation do, that while ‘targeted killing has been unable to stop terrorism’, its
merit cannot be judged from its viability as a singular strategy. That being said, David often
relies upon counterfactual claims to underpin his arguments for leadership decapitation. In one
section, he concludes his claim by stating ‘it is possible that even more Israeli civilians would
have been killed if not for the policy’ 32. It is also possible that without the state-sponsored
assassination policy, the number of Israeli casualties would have plateaued in response to tried,
counterterrorism measures, or increased from internal pressures within Hamas. David offers no
definitive answer as to why the presence of a targeted killing policy would directly correlate with
fewer dead Israelis.

David makes his most compelling argument for leadership decapitation, however, in
‘Fatal Choices’, where he posits that ‘Israel’s policy [of targeted assassination] has hurt the
29
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capability of its adversaries to prosecute attacks’ 33. This claim is one also voiced by Byman,
Johnston, and Price – once terrorists are altering their behavior for fear of being killed, they are
subtracting time, effort, and money from conducting acts of terrorism. David writes:

There is some evidence that targeted killings have reduced the
performance of terrorist operations. Israelis estimate they stop over 80
percent

of

attempts,

and

the

incidence

of

poorly

planned

attacks...indicates that there have been problems either with the
organization of the operations or with those available to carry them out. 34

This would suggest that the poor planning and implementation of terrorist attacks witnessed by
Israeli security forces was causally correlated with the continued practice of targeting middle
and upper level Hamas members.
Bryan Price, in ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’, offers a theory-based explication on the
efficacy of leadership decapitation. He finds that terrorist groups are susceptible to leadership
decapitation because of the very nature of the groups themselves. Price argues that because
terrorist organizations operate clandestinely, and are ‘values-based’ leadership transitions are
made more difficult35. He alludes to the concept of the charismatic leader as well as the
cohesiveness innate to violent organizations as proof that leadership succession would not be a
simple endeavor in the event that a leader is removed. To wit, terrorist organizations are
inherently dependent upon their leadership.
Price’s assessment of leadership decapitation is constrained by the parameters of his
theoretical model, which assumes the characteristic of value-centricity is true of all terrorist
organizations. One can see how this presumption could skew results. However, when
considering terrorist organizations, it is difficult to come up with many groups that do not – at
their core – use terrorism in furtherance of some agenda, ideal, or belief.

Johnston, in Does Decapitation Work?, also finds that leadership decapitation is an
insufficient strategy in and of itself to ensure the organizational collapse of a terrorist or
33
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insurgent group. While he concludes that 'the data...[shows] conclusively that killing or
capturing...leaders is usually not a silver bullet,' Johnston also contends that his 'results do not
support the common argument that the costs of failed targeting outweigh the benefits of
successful targeting' 36.

Johnston's methodology and datasets are significantly larger and more comprehensive
than those of Price or Byman. Using the START's Terrorist Organizations Profiles database,
Johnston focuses mainly on 'plausibly exogenous' episodes of leadership decapitation.
Johnston defines 'plausibly exogenous' as overt or documented efforts to assassinate or
capture leadership that reached operational level and excludes ones that do not37. Using this
method, Johnston arrives at 118 attempts to remove terrorist leaders – 46 of which were
successful, or 39%. Examining this data, Johnston finds that 'neutralizing insurgent leaders has
a substantively large and statistically significant effect on numerous metrics of countermilitancy
effectiveness' 38. He further notes that following decapitation, groups were 25 to 30 percent
more likely to suffer organizational death.

Johnston's study is most notably limited by a myopic focus on the viability of leadership
removal in insurgencies. As Jenna Jordan notes, ‘although some terrorist groups are also
insurgents, many insurgent organizations do not employ terrorist tactics’ 39. Where Price relies
on a theory-based model to drive his analysis, Johnston is missing a core, theoretical discourse
on leadership decapitation. Johnston makes little effort to mention an implementation strategy
for leadership decapitation, namely, when it should or should not be employed by states. Nor
does he discuss the operational implications for leadership removal for their organizations, or
more basically, why decapitation is an effective strategy. A further criticism is Johnston’s nonsubscription to the notion of a ‘Martyrdom Effect’, writing that he ‘found no evidence’ of it 40. The
term denotes the process whereby the death or capture of leader can result in subsequent
veneration of him or her by their respective group. However, one need look no further than the
many Hamas leaders and operatives who, after being assassinated by the Israeli
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counterterrorism apparatus, were memorialized in the names of schools, plazas, streets, and
offshoot groups (e.g. the Disciples of the Martyr Yahya Ayyash [DOMYA]).
Patrick Dear’s article, Beheading the Hydra, offers a qualitative approach to
understanding the ramifications of leadership decapitation on terrorist and insurgent groups.
Unique among similar studies on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation, Dear conducts a
series of interviews with experts, analysts, and insiders ‘in order to bridge the gap between the
academic and military debates’. Less uniquely, Dear finds that leadership decapitation vis-a-vis
assassination ‘can have an advantageous tactical effect...in certain limited and specific
circumstances,’ and ‘as part of a wider strategy’ 41. Dear makes an interesting assessment of
the perils of the overuse of leadership decapitation, arguing that ‘it does not follow that a
repeated use of targeted killing will cause a greater reduction in insurgent capability. Insurgent
networks adapt in response to targeted killing, changing structure and dispersing capability to
ensure their resilience’ 42. The implications of Dear’s argument, are primarily that leadership
decapitation does not allow for the tactical landscape to remain constant after its usage.
Rather, those who target militant leadership will have to do so sparingly in order to maximize its
utility.
Dear is especially critical of the ‘opaqueness’ of the process of designating and
executing decapitation maneuvers on militant groups. He cites a UN Special Rapporteur’s report
on the Extrajudicial, Summary, and Arbitrary Executions brief on the lack of oversight and
scrutiny on this process in countries like Israel where leadership decapitation campaigns are
heavily institutionalized. While Dear does well to reference the lack of transparency in oversight,
one would think after interviewing military personnel on such operations, he would be able to
appreciate – if only partially – the import of discretion and minimal oversight. High-value targets
are often alerted by leaked or less secure government countermeasures, designed to ensnare
or eliminate them. Congressional or Supreme Court review, for example, of the methods by
which the United States government and affiliated agencies carry out decapitation operations
would bring a wider consciousness to the issue, and possibly limit its applicability while it
remains under review. This would constrain the already limited applicability recommended by
Dear for the usage of leadership decapitation.
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Arguments Against Leadership Decapitation
For those that oppose targeted killing – a potential measure for leadership decapitation –
there are the legal and ethical ramifications for considering policy of assassination or extrication.
However, for scholarship, the issue of reprisals or ‘backlash effect’ as Audrey Cronin calls it, is
of primary concern. Many authors suggest that should a terrorist group interpret the targeting of
their leadership as an establishment of the rules of engagement, there is no plausible guarantee
that such groups would not utilize a similar strategy in targeting the state leadership that
opposes them. Cronin mentions this fact in How Terrorism Ends, wherein she argues that state
‘governments are at a serious disadvantage, especially democratic states: public figures cannot
be perfectly protected; indeed, a major aspect of most elected politicians’ jobs is to be visible
and available, making them more vulnerable to assassination than the leaders of clandestine
organizations’ 43. For Cronin, the susceptibility of democratic leaders to assassination – or
potentially kidnapping – constitutes a reason for pause when considering making use of
leadership decapitation as a strategy for countering extremist violence. The fear of backlash
effect is amplified when states employ ‘repressive counterterrorism’ measures, which Cronin
warns can be sufficient for halting an insurgency or terrorist activities, but ultimately undermine
state credibility.

Al-Qaeda has demonstrated the tit-for-tat mindset, as Byman calls it, when espousing a
rationale for its attacks. Usama bin Ladin has stated that ‘America does not understand the
language of manners and principles, so we are addressing it using the language it understands’.
He goes on to accuse the United States of ‘stealing our wealth and oil’ as well as ‘[occupying]
our countries’, claiming that those killed by American campaigns and policies ‘must be equally
revenged’. Bin Ladin’s statements demonstrating the readiness with which terrorists
organizations incorporate the tactics used to undermine them as a rationalization for violence 44.
For leaders of terrorist organizations, the sentiment that ‘the oppressed have a right to return
the aggression’, as Usama bin Ladin put it in his Letter to America45.
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For detractors of leadership decapitation, the adage ‘better the devil you know than the
one you don’t’ rings true. There is no guarantee that once a leader of a terrorist organization is
removed, his or her replacement will be more amenable reducing violent activity – they could
very likely view the hostile measures that removed their predecessor as a reason to become
more hardened and violent themselves. Cronin speaks to this, writing that ‘the original
charismatic leader may indeed be irreplaceable, or he may not...It is not at all guaranteed that
the successor will be an improvement, from a counter-terrorism perspective’ 46. There was a
strong reticence among analysts and scholarship, for example, to condone the assassination of
the former leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Velupillai Prabhakaran, for
fear that his confidante and militia leader, Colonel Shankar, would replace him. Colonel Shankar
was almost universally considered among Indian army intelligence as being more ruthless than
Prabhakaran47. Shankar was known for routinely ordering his Sea Tigers unit to execute
prisoners, especially those who were from military or intelligence aparati. Removing a leader, in
the case of the LTTE, would have likely resulted in a more brutal leadership regime, one less
attuned to other, less violent means of de-escalation.
Detractors also contend that the often bureaucratized ranks of terrorist organizations –
referred to as ‘organizational resilience’48 – allow for a timely and efficient leadership turnover.
Jordan makes this argument, among others, in Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark as to
why and how leadership decapitation strikes fail to bring about organizational collapse. Jordan
writes:

Many terrorist organizations are hierarchical: their authority comes
from the top; and they have an administrative staff; they follow rules
and standard operating procedures; and they maintain functionally
separate branches and infrastructure. Even clandestine organizations
such as terrorist groups can organize themselves bureaucratically 49.
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If bureaucracies operating within the financial sector operate in a similar capacity as
terrorist organizations – the argument that Jordan makes – then their bureaucratic apparatus
should allow for relatively smooth leadership transitions.

Most notably, detractors point to the difference between leadership decapitation and its
outcomes in theory and in practice – the latter being wholly uncertain. Again, Cronin speaks to
the uncertainty surrounding the after-effects of leadership removal, stating that those who
advocate the practice ‘must think not only tactically but strategically, analyzing the second and
third-order effects of the removal of terrorist leaders...Removing the leader may reduce a
group’s operational efficiency in the short term, or it may raise the stakes for members of a
group to “prove” their mettle by carrying out dramatic attacks’ 50.

Literature Review

One of the most adamant opponents of leadership decapitation stratagem, Jenna Jordan
argues first in When Heads Roll (2009) and again in Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark
(2014), that the policy is ineffective at best. In the former, Jordan approaches the issue with an
objective mindset, setting out to determine why leadership decapitation has variable success.
Her research observes what conditions favor group collapse; if the strategy increases the
probability of organizational death, and barring its successful implementation, if the strategy has
any deleterious effects or hinders operational capacity. Her quantitative, research model is
developed from a dataset of 298 incidents of leadership decapitation over a sixty-one year
period (1945– 2004). Jordan’s dependent variable is ‘coded according to two different measures
of effectiveness: decisiveness and organizational degradation’ 51. She defines terrorist
leadership as ‘either the top leader of an organization or any member of the upper echelon who
holds a position of authority within the organization’, and operational success by whether ‘an
organization was inactive for two years following the incident of decapitation’ a measurement
she gleaned from the U.S. State Department’s process of labelling of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs)52. Jordan’s regression analyses lead her to conclude that terrorist
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organizations rarely end after their leadership is killed or captured, labelling the effort a
‘misguided strategy’ and stating that it is ‘actually counterproductive’53.
Jordan’s research runs into a problem when she includes studies on Israel’s policy of
leadership decapitation during the Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa). The issue here is twofold: first,
leadership decapitation, as employed by the Israeli military and Shin Bet, involved exclusively
targeted killing operations, rarely taking suspected or confirmed terrorists into custody; and
second, as Steven David noted, Israeli counterterrorism efforts did not solely target ‘top
leaders,’ or those of ‘the upper echelon’. Rather, Shin bet regularly designated mid-level
terrorists who were seen as ‘important enough to disrupt a terrorist cell but not so important as
to provoke retaliation’54. In this context, one of Jordan’s primary empirical sources does not
comport with the parameters of her own research in significant enough ways to skew the data.
Jordan’s 2014 article, entitled Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark, appears less
definitive on leadership decapitation’s ineffectiveness. The crux of her argument in this article
centers upon the organizational resilience of terrorist groups – their ability to resist collapse
through an efficient mechanism of leadership turnover – and the bases of popular support that
ensure group survival. Jordan contends that as groups age, they lend themselves to
bureaucratization, realized through intricate, internal structuring, and preparation for
contingencies such as leadership removal.
A shortcoming of ‘Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark’ lies in Jordan’s theory of
bureaucratization in so far as it too heavily relies on the comparison between terrorist
organizations’ behavior and the actions of non-criminal organizations, i.e. private sector
companies. She argues that ‘Even clandestine organizations such as terrorist groups can
organize themselves bureaucratically,’ which increases ‘stability by making organizations
capable of surviving leadership turnover’ 55. Her claim that bureaucratization decreases ‘the
likelihood of organizational failure’ relies on a theory of Economics understanding of
bureaucratization56. This is evidenced by the sources she cites for the value of bureaucracies –
over a dozen management and economics journals – that ignore the notion that terrorist groups
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are continuously being scoured for weaknesses by which to be exploited and ultimately
dismantled.
Terrorist organizations routinely suffer from systemic, exogenous – and potentially
endogenous – shocks that can psychologically and physically impact the terrorist group in a way
it would not impact a legitimate organization. A CEO would not lament replacing his or her
predecessor in an large-scale, commercial organization, however a successive terrorist leader
may reconsider leading a terrorist group whose last several leaders were assassinated in gory
fashion, or captured, tortured, and imprisoned indefinitely.
In ‘Testing the Snake Head Strategy’, Aaron Mannes compares 81 episodes of
leadership decapitation, beginning in 1968. Mannes’s definition of leadership decapitation is
noticeably more focused in that ‘the only events taken into consideration were those that
affected either the organization’s leader or second in command’. Mannes follows Jordan’s tract
of observing the first two years after leadership removal to determine organizational operability,
but also adds a five-year observation mark to also gauge long-term outcomes. He determines
success by ‘decreased activity, reflected in lower numbers of incidents and killings in the period
of time after the event’57. Mannes’s regression leads he him to skeptically conclude that ‘the
limited effect of the decapitation strategy, particularly on fatal attacks by terrorist groups raises
doubts about its overall efficacy’. Mannes notes the potential for utility in removing leadership
with a decline in episodes of terrorism sometimes resulting from leadership removal. However,
this fails to meet his standard of organizational death and two to five-year inoperability. While
Mannes himself believes that ‘in order to better understand the impact of decapitation strikes,
more data is necessary’, his own research parameters suggests that leadership decapitation is
not a viable or sustainable strategy, but can prove counterproductive58.

Hafez and Hatfield, in their article, Do Targeted Assassinations Work?, provide an
interesting counter-balance to Steven David’s examination of Israel’s response to the Second
Intifada. The two examine the policy of targeted killing juxtaposed with the rates of Palestinian
violence in Israel from 2000 to 2004 during the period of the al-Aqsa uprising. Hafez and
Hatfield are foremost concerned with whether:

57
58

Mannes, Aaron. "Testing the Snake Head Strategy" p. 41, 42, 43.
Mannes, Aaron. "Testing the Snake Head Strategy" p. 43, 44.

20

targeted assassinations produce a disruption effect and diminish violence
over time...the number and success rate of attacks in the long-run as
militant groups suffer the loss of experienced cadres and commanders,
and allocated precious resources to secure the remaining leadership.59
They determine that ‘targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian
violence, even when time lags associated with possible reactive retaliations are taken into
account’60. Further, they contend that there are little to no ramifications as pertaining to an
increase or decrease in levels of violence, directly contradicting arguments made by David 61.
Instead, the authors suggest that a range of defensive initiatives from more robust security at
checkpoints to increased law enforcement presence may account for the decrease in violence.
Hafez and Hatfield’s research and the pronouncements they make from it are limited
foremost by the scope of their study. The limited time span for observability – a period of four
years – and a small empirical pool – the case of Israel and the first and second Intifadas – does
not convey the degree of certainty necessary to say with conviction that targeted assassination
‘should not be presented as a proven solution to patterns of political violence and rebellion’62.
While their evidence does suggest that targeted killing had no impact on levels of violence,
many factors, such as the importance of popular support by Palestinian, non-combatants, are
not considered.
Audrey Cronin’s How Terrorism Ends is arguably the most comprehensive appraisal of
leadership decapitation and its place in counterterrorism by virtue of the sheer number of
empirical sources utilized, as well as her analysis of them. Her first chapter, ‘Decapitation:
Catching or Killing the Leader’, offers insight into how leadership decapitations can end
terrorism and what ramifications it has in the long-term. Of the many episodes of leadership
removal that Cronin explores, she suggests that arresting leaders of terrorist organizations is
the most plausible method of ensuring that terror groups do not respond in violence and
potentially disperse. She posits that subjecting the leaders of terrorist organizations to ‘the rule
of law, [emphasizing] the rule of law, [profiling] leaders as criminals, and [demonstrating] the
59
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rule of law’ has proven most efficient in curtailing terrorist activity63. However, she also adds that
‘repression’ is also a potential way in which to limit terrorist activity and end a specific terrorist
group. She warns, however, that repressive counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics do
not diminish popular support for a cause that may have been the root of terrorist activity, and
only serves to eliminate a highly specific terrorist threat or group, not the greater problem of
radicalization and willingness to employ terrorism64.
One is forced to acknowledge the breadth and depth of Cronin’s research and while its
limits are quite few, they are noticeable. Foremost, Cronin’s assessment of how leadership
decapitation impacts terrorist organizations belies the truth of the practice. In focusing on the
mitigating factors of why leadership decapitation is largely ineffective, her research does little to
address the sobering reality of its regular implementation. Her research misses the fact that
leadership decapitation is a path-dependent strategy already under employment in the United
States and several other state actors. Secondly, Cronin’s various methods of leadership
decapitation, e.g. arrest, targeted killing, repression, etc., fall short of realizing that often a
singular counter-terrorism strategy or state apparatus can, at times, employ all or some of these
methods. Rather, they are not always mutually exclusive of one another.

Leadership Decapitation Factors

Among the most prominent and probable factors mentioned by academics as to the
overall effectiveness of leadership decapitation in bringing organizational death to a terrorist
group are age, structure, and motivation. I reaffirm what has been argued by many scholars and
researchers; that the aspects of relative age, structure type, and internal motivation likely
determine whether and when a kingpin strategy would cause the cessation of terrorist activity or
dissolve the group.

Age of Terrorist Organizations

While agreement among scholarship is hard to come by with regards to the efficacy of
leadership decapitation, among its proponents, the age of terror groups appears to be a strong
mitigating factor in determining its vulnerability to decapitation. Bryan Price argues that the
63
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‘earlier leadership decapitation occurs in a terrorist group’s life cycle, the greater the effect it will
have on the group’s mortality rate’ to which he adds that ‘the effects...diminish by half in the first
ten years, and after approximately twenty years, leadership decapitation may have no effect on
the group’s mortality rate’ 65. Price is not alone in the assertion that the two decade marker is
pivotal for those who would implement a strategy of leadership decapitation66. Surviving the
initial years of turbulence as a terrorist organization can strengthen a group's core of leadership,
allow for the creation of a network of supply and communication lines, name viable successors
in the event of leadership decapitation, build training camps, establish ties with regional
communities for materiel and personnel support, and provide the valuable time necessary to
consolidate resources in order to perform clandestine acts of terrorism67.
Structure of Terrorist Organizations

Jenna Jordan states that 'the susceptibility of organizations to decapitation...vary based
on organizational type' 68. The operational success, or likely employment of leadership
decapitation against a terrorist group should be determined by whether the organization is
singularly dependent upon the skills and resources of that figure to survive. If a terrorist group is
reliant upon its foremost leader because he or she brings explosives expertise or financial
resources, for example, to the group, then their extrication will represent a 'loss of human capital'
69

. Still, if the leadership exemplifies a sense of religious adherence or is emblematic of a military

success over a past enemy, their arrest or death will be a symbolic wound, but not an
operationally fatal one. To this end, terrorist groups that are structured hierarchically with a
singular or small core of leadership at its topmost rung – like those that arise from political
institutions – are most vulnerable to a loss of leadership. Groups that operate more diffusely,
with loosely oriented cells or ‘nodes’ and a less coterminous leadership hierarchy are less
susceptible to leadership decapitation derailing future acts of terror because permission or
funding from leadership is not a prerequisite for action.
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Internal Motivation of Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups whose foundations are predicated upon a fundamental, religious belief
or set of beliefs, or whose actions arise from an ideological imperative have proven especially
violent70. In fact, some evidence suggests that the use of leadership decapitation against
violent, religious extremists, can increase their level of violence71. However, there is reason to
believe that when leadership decapitation occurs within terrorist groups whose sole basis for
violent activity is religious compulsion, those groups lose direction, morale, and subsequently
the necessity to carry out acts of violence. On the other hand, when terrorist groups who
employ terrorism to purely nationalistic ends or as a means of achieving sovereignty experience
leadership decapitation, it does not irrevocably harm the greater organization because the
cause remains the same. Rather, the death of a leader can be perceived as martyrdom to the
cause of statehood and further galvanize the movement to acts of retaliation, viewing the
leader’s removal as a form of brinksmanship and increased investment in the cause from which
cessation would mean a loss of investment.
Case Studies

The case studies I have selected for examination vary in region, time period, target type,
means of violence, period of operation, and type of group structuring. These differences are
meant to separate the cases from biases of similarity. Still, the terrorist groups selected share
some base similarities: they all have a structural framework that undergirds them, providing
either a hierarchical or horizontal structuring, they all operate by a core motivation that binds its
members and drives terrorist activity, and they all have known ages that lend themselves to the
U.S. State Department’s designation of operational activity or inactivity for a period of two years.
These shared factors, alongside the general variety of the case studies, I believe, provides for
an even assessment by which to test the aforementioned variables of age, motivation, and
structure on array of groups.
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Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) – Abimael Guzman

The Peruvian, radical Marxist group, Sendero Luminoso, under Abimael Guzman
performed acts of intimidation, kidnapping, and terrorism during the late 20th century, becoming
known as the ‘Fourth Sword of Marxism’. However, following his arrest in 1992, the extremist
group saw a political rebirth that stemmed its tide of violent, clandestine behavior. Although
Sendero Luminoso did not dissolve as a result of Guzman’s arrest and trial, leadership
decapitation undoubtedly had a hand in dissuading the organization from further acts of
terrorism and violence.

The Communist Party of Peru, Sendero Luminoso, was the brainchild of Peruvian
philosophy professor, Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzman Reynoso or Abimael Guzman. Although
formed in 1960, Sendero Luminoso had largely been a University based, social project geared
towards introducing a Marxist movement into Peru’s political sphere. It was not until the
Peruvian government reintroduced democratic elections in 1980 that Sendero Luminoso, under
the guidance of Guzman, became a militant insurgency that utilized executions and acts of
terrorism to gain recognition. Capitalizing on the impoverished and the illiterate in Peru, Guzman
consolidated authority through the summary execution of his detractors, both external and
internal to Sendero Luminoso. Guzman’s grandiose vision for Peru included a ‘semipermanent,
quasi-Maoist Cultural Revolution’ though many referred to him ironically as ‘President Gonzalo’
72

. Within the brief span of a decade of militant activity, Sendero Luminoso had become

responsible for the burning of ballot boxes during election cycles, the attempted assassination of
then-President of the Peruvian National Electoral Council, Domingo Garcia Rada, the
kidnapping and killing of French aid workers and Italian missionaries, extortion and execution of
tens of thousands of Peruvian citizens, and the establishment of an insurgency in Ayacucho,
Huanca Sancos, and the Andean region several thousand members strong.

By 1990, the government of Peru had declared a state of emergency and armed a
militia-like, counterinsurgency called the Comites de Auto Defensa or the Committee for Self
Defense, consisting of approximately 7,000 Peruvian Rondas. Simultaneously, Peru’s National
Intelligence Service and Army Intelligence Service had been dispatched to the Sendero
Luminoso stronghold of Ayacucho to combat the insurgency, but in so doing, killed dozens of
Peruvian citizens, including many children. These counterinsurgency raids resulted in the
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arrests or deaths of key lieutenants in the Sendero Luminoso but had an inadvertent backlash
effect, causing many Peruvian citizens to view Sendero Luminoso as the lesser of two evils.

The ineffectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts on the part of the Fujimori government
can also be attributed to the highly particularized, membership structure of Sendero Luminoso.
Regarding the intricacy of the organization’s internal structure, Audrey Cronin writes,

The leadership...remained highly personalized: new militants were required
to write a letter of subjugation, in which they pledged their lives, not only to
the cause, but to Guzman personally. Guzman’s role as the cultish, even
deified intellectual leader was never in doubt. (How Terrorism Ends. Cronin,
2009)
Because Sendero Luminoso’s ‘organizational depth seemed impenetrable and impersonal’ (p.
19), it became apparent to Peruvian intelligence that the most damaging blow that could be dealt
to the organization would be the extrication of its foremost leadership figure – Guzman himself.

On 12 September 1992, Peruvian military captured Guzman in Lima, along with
members of the Sendero Luminoso leadership. Subsequent to his capture, the homicide
statistics for Peru declined by half and in the following months, levels of violence continued to
drop73. During his trial, Guzman entered the courtroom in an outdated, striped prisoner’s uniform,
and was held in a steel cage transported by police and military officers where he remained for
the duration of his trial. The televised trial was conducted by a panel of judges and presided over
by a military court that ultimately sentenced him to life in prison.

Age

Shining Path had not quite met the 20 year designation traditionally attributable to being
resilient to leadership decapitation, hence we cannot rule out age as a factor in the
organization’s period of inactivity. Considering Sendero Luminoso’s relative youth as an
insurgency, it was unable to establish the necessary lines of supply, or consolidate and maintain
the local support needed to survive annexation by the Peruvian government. Further, the group's
controlled territory simply grew too large, too fast within its later years of existence. Without
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bolstering its infrastructure in order to survive a government incursion, Sendero Luminoso’s area
of control became vulnerable first to the Comites de Auto Defensa, and later to the intervening
Peruvian military.

As well, Sendero Luminoso's shortened longevity likely contributed to its inability to
formulate surreptitious financial networks to better disseminate and launder illicit funds that could
be hidden from the Peruvian government. Funds, along with personnel and popular support, are
the foundation of successful insurgencies like the DAESH, and the FARC. When Abimael
Guzman was arrested at a downtown apartment in Lima in 1992, he was found with a trove of
computer disks that held membership records as well as most of the group’s financial
information. This singular cache of information allowed Peruvian intelligence to undermine any
future funding of acts of terror by Sendero Luminoso and further prosecute Guzman for acts of
financial criminality.

Structure
Two years before Guzman’s arrest and incarceration, one of Shining Path’s political
representatives remarked that ‘there is no number two. There is only Presidente Gonzalo and
then the party,’ and with a sense of foreboding, adding that ‘without Presidente Gonzalo, we
would have nothing’74. Guzman’s unwillingness to groom or name a successor, left Sendero
Luminoso particularly susceptible to leadership decapitation. Guzman’s top-down leadership,
cult of personality, and unquestioned authority within Shining Path made it largely unnecessary
to name a successor. In addition, Guzman was personally responsible for designating targets for
assassination and orchestrating anti-government operations within the span of a decade that did
not afford him the time necessary to name a successor, had he wanted to. Following Guzman,
Oscar Ramirez Duran – or ‘Feliciano’ – attempted to pick up where Guzman had left off, but
Sendero Luminoso’s reliance on ‘President Gonzalo’ was too strong to overcome the
subsequent fracturing of the group and the temptation of government-offered amnesty75. Duran
was himself arrested in 1999 by Peruvian authorities.

74

"Guzman Arrest Leaves Void in Shining Path’s Leadership."Deseret News. The Associated Press, 14 Sept. 1992.
Web.
75
Rochlin, James Francis. “Sendero Luminoso” Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 71. Print.

27

Sendero Luminoso’s clearly structured chain of command, with Guzman at it top, made a
‘kingpin strategy’ particularly effective. Guzman had become so revered, even deified, that no
other member of the group could provide the same ideological and charismatic influence to drive
the group’s activities. Guzman’s hierarchical organization was so dependent upon him that at his
request, they were willing to ‘lay down their arms’ and renounce acts of violence76.

Motivation

Sendero Luminoso possessed well-defined, ideological objectives of establishing a
Maoist style communist regime in Peru. However, the group became susceptible to leadership
decapitation because it was singularly dependent upon Guzman for ideological directives and
inspiration. The ideology of Sendero Luminoso was so inextricably linked with Guzman that the
group philosophy of Peruvian communism that it became encapsulated in what was termed as
‘Gonzalo Thought’ – the extrapolation and often rote-memorized communist interpretations of
Guzman. Indeed, Guzman was valued by the group to such a degree that when he went
underground in 1989, and was not seen by many until his arrest three years later, the mystique
and reverence for the unseen, ‘Presidente Guzman’ only widened.
Guzman’s charisma within his group was counterbalanced by waning, local support from
the Peruvian lower classes. The Peruvian peasants of the Ayacucho highlands provided for an
early warning system of sorts against the intrusion of Peruvian security forces. However, with the
diminishing support of the peasantry, security raids became a more frequent77. When Guzman
was arrested in Lima in 1992, the group became essentially directionless. The central motivation
did not remain pursuing a communist central government, but singularly obsessed with freeing
Guzman. Leadership decapitation was further successful in the case of Sendero Luminoso
because the ideological structure of the organization was bound with Guzman’s particularized
rhetoric and interpretation of what communism could mean for the poor and disenfranchised of
Peru.
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Measuring Success & Effects

Although the life of Sendero Luminoso spanned nearly 50 years, its militant insurgency
encompassed only a brief, twelve years. During that time however, an immense amount of
property was destroyed and Guzman's organization was seen as culpable for approximately
30,000 Peruvians casualties in total (e.g. Terrorist acts, skirmishes with security and military,
kidnappings, etc.) of whom 11,000 were civilians78. The thirteen-year militancy of Sendero
Luminoso ended largely with the leadership decapitation of Abimael Guzman, without whom the
violent potency of the group could not survive. The briefness of the group’s terrorist activities
cannot exclusively be attributed to its youth. Nonetheless, the short amount of time during which
Sendero Luminoso conducted acts of terrorism in Peru, coupled with the intensity of those
activities made the means necessary for its survival after Guzman’s arrest most likely too difficult
for the group to successfully implement.
Figure 1.1. Number of Shining Path Incidents (1980 – 1992)79

years in operation

Figure 1.1 illustrates the number of incidents attributed to Shining Path from 1980, when
the group’s militancy began, to 1992 when Guzman was arrested by Peruvian authorities. An
additional two years are included subsequent to Guzman’s arrest to determine the operational
operability of Shining Path.
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In Figure 1.1, the data demonstrates that Shining Path attacks were on the downturn
before Guzman’s arrest, beginning in 1991. This was likely due to Guzman himself going
underground in the wake of government efforts to apprehend or assassinate him. In 1992, likely
correlative with Guzman’s arrest, the number of incidents begins an even sharper decline in
number. By 1993, Shining Path is carrying out only a fraction of the acts of terrorism that it was
under Guzman’s leadership. Still, by 1998, Shining Path has either no incidents for which it took
credit publicly, or the number is so small it has not registered in START’s data.

It should be noted that in 2002, Sendero Luminoso had a strong resurgence of activity,
under a new, younger leadership. A series of embassy bombings, hostage-taking, and
kidnappings, followed for nearly a decade, in spite of a diminishment in the group’s active
members80. However, repeated government-led, leadership decapitation measures resulted in
the killing or capturing of nearly all of Sendero Luminoso’s resurgent leaders. By 2013, Shining
Path was declared ‘totally defeated’, by the Peruvian president and ‘unable to operate’81.

The resurgence of Shining Path has been attributed to a particularly militant faction of the
group that refused amnesty after Duran’s arrest. However, it still appears that leadership
decapitation remained a capable tool in dismantling Sendero Luminoso, given that all potential
leadership members were captured or killed simultaneously82. Given the ideological motivation of
the group, but its failure to conform to the political norms of Peru, as my theory for typological
behavior suggests, the group failed to achieve its stated goal of a Marxist revolution in Peru and
has, by most accounts, dissolved.
Al-Qa’ida – Usama bin Ladin
Al-Qa’ida’s loss of Usama bin Ladin illustrates the pitfalls of leadership decapitation in
groups that are hierarchically structured, older, well-financed, bureaucratized, and maintain a
clearly stated motivation that remains unchanged in the face of counter-terrorism measures. AlQa’ida survived in spite of its founder’s demise, I suggest, because by the time he was targeted
the group had already reached an age benchmark and had prepared for such an eventuality.
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Also displayed by the case of al-Qa’ida is the interplay of the revenge motive in targeting
leadership. While targeting a terrorist leader successfully can be a propaganda tool for a state’s
counter-terrorism apparatus, it can also proffer the impression that a state government is
vengeful rather than pragmatic.

Al-Qa'ida, with Usama bin Ladin, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al-Zawahiri at its head is
one of the oldest, operationally active terrorist organizations still in existence. Founded during
the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qa'ida, or 'the Foundation' grew as part of a
larger contingent of Sunni, Mujahideen combatting a Soviet-led coalition. Al-Qa'ida’s roots are
far less innocuous than its more contemporary reputation might suggest. In response to the
Soviet war in Afghanistan, Usama bin Ladin and Islamic scholar and Muslim Brotherhood
member, Abdullah Azzam formed the Maktab al-Khidamat in 1984. The Maktab al-Khidamat
(MAK) or ‘Services Office’ was founded in Peshawar province as a means for consolidating
financial resources and directing Mujahideen recruits to the Afghanistan conflict. By 1988, alQa'ida became functional alongside the MAK until the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan in
1989. In that same year, Azzam was assassinated by an unknown entity and the mujahid under
his command had come under the auspices of al-Qa'ida.
As Usama bin Ladin moved from state to state – exiled by Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Yemen, and the Sudan – his organization expanded operational nodes from where he fled.
Michael Horowitz, in The Diffusion of Military Power, notes that 'the connection between Al
Qaeda and Hezbollah became one of these crucial nodes, particularly in the spread of suicide
terrorism around the world'83 and is indicative of al-Qa'ida's propensity to adapt through
proliferation of these 'nodes'. During the 1990s, the Taliban offered protection and safe haven for
al-Qa'ida and bin Ladin in return for military training and materiel support.

It was at this time that the CIA, received intelligence that al-Qa'ida was determined to
attack what it perceived one of the 'far enemy', the United States. The Central Intelligence
Agency, Counter-Terrorism Center report – though heavily redacted – read:

Reporting suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the
US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh Umar Abd
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al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq Awda...Sources indicate
the Bin Ladin organization or its allies are moving closer to implementing
anti-US attacks at unspecified locations84.

This fear was later realised with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the 1998
bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, the suicide attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni
Gulf in 2000, and the subsequent attacks of September 2001.

The respective invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003 led to an extended armed
conflict that forced Usama bin Ladin and his organizational leadership into hiding. The protracted
bombing of Tora Bora in late 2001 pushed the al-Qa'ida 'emir' to further disappear into the
Federated Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where he remained for ten years. Likely from late 2005 until
2011, bin Ladin was residing in a modest compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Utilising
intelligence garnered from bin Ladin's network of couriers, the CIA and Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) had extensively formulated a raid on the Pakistani safe-house, codenamed
‘Operation Neptune Spearhead’. On May 1st, bin Ladin was killed during the ensuing firefight,
along with three members of his cadre and a female hostage. Bin Ladin’s corpse was
expeditiously buried at sea, but not before his identity was confirmed by DNA ferisis.

Age
The longer, operational life-span of al-Qa’ida allowed it to draw on operatives where
necessary – as evidenced by the diversity of membership participation in the 9/11 attacks, with
some operatives coming from Munich and the United States, while others were Pakistani and
Egyptian nationals. To this end, Stephen Holmes writes that '[Al-Qa’ida's] basic rationality can be
inferred from their decision to mobilize fast-moving light forces acting in secrecy. This is a highly
efficient way to deploy the modest resources at their disposal'85. Longevity of age afforded alQa’ida the ability to train individuals in Afghanistan and Yemen while inserting others into
western societies. Further, because of al-Qa’ida’s thirty-one years in operation, it was able to
survive the death of its leadership, best represented by Usama bin Ladin. With networks of
intelligence, suppliers, supporters, recruiters and operatives in place for decades before his
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demise, the death of bin Ladin had only a modest effect on al-Qa’ida’s ability to carry out acts of
terrorism. This would suggest that al-Qa’ida’s age and the abilities amassed through its threedecade-long existence, factored into the ineffectiveness of leadership decapitation in
precipitating organizational death.

Structure
Al-Qa’ida has the hallmarks of a hierarchically structured, terrorist organization. While
many aspects of the group remain autonomous – such as the perpetration of acts of terrorism
like those seen in London in 2007 – there are definitive branches of al-Qa’ida as well as a
ranking of leadership which takes precedence. Usama bin Ladin was recognized as emir of alQa’ida until his death in 2011, when, after an interim emir, Zawahiri assumed command
leadership.

According to the theory put forth in my introduction, hierarchically structured, terrorist
groups should be more susceptible to a kingpin strategy. Why then did Usama bin Ladin’s death
not result in the degradation or dissolution of al-Qa’ida? I believe bureaucratization to be the
likely culprit. In other words, the age of al-Qa’ida, and the advantages afforded to it because of
its advanced age, eclipsed the structural orientation factor. Al-Qa’ida’s bureaucratized structure
manifested itself in numerous ways, from the establishment of different, operational branches
responsible for activities ranging from media and propaganda and financing to training
operatives, and a madrasa council that presided over issues regarding the interpretation and
application of Shari’a86. Most importantly, bureaucratization, as it concerns al-Qa’ida, allowed the
group to formulate contingencies for leadership turnover in the event of leadership decapitation.
Thus, in this case, the factors of age and structural bureaucratization worked in the favor of alQa’ida to reinforce organizational resilience.

Motivation
Al-Qa’ida has, from its inception, espoused a fundamentalist, conservative, antirevisionist theology of Sunni, Islam referred to as Salafism or Wahhabism, referring literally to
the ‘ancient ones’ or the original companions of Mohammed. Still, one can attribute the entirety
of al-Qa’ida’s ideological impetus to Salafism, independent of the social and political changes
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undergirding Islam in the late 1970s. Al-Qa’ida is, instead, can better be understood as
motivated by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, particularly those in his seminal treatise, entitled
Milestones. Qutb’s writings, especially those in Milestones, had such a pronounced effect on bin
Laden’s thoughts towards non-Muslims and western culture, that his rhetoric often mirrored that
of Qutb’s. The self-righteousness often espoused by bin Ladin and Zawahiri, can be traced to a
passage from the Prologue of Qutb’s Milestones:

In the world there is only one party of God; all others are parties of Satan and
rebellion...There is only one way to reach God; all other ways do not lead to
Him. For human life, there is only one true system, and that is Islam; all other
systems are Jahiliyyah87. There is only one law which ought to be followed,
and that is the Shari'ah from God; anything else is mere emotionalism and
impulsiveness...The truth is one and indivisible; anything different from it is
error88.

Although a majority of contemporary Muslims, particularly those in western countries,
would disagree with Qutb and bin Ladin’s interpretation of Islamic theology, bin Ladin, Zawahiri,
and Azzam made use of a religious foundation – pardon the pun – of Islamic hermeneutics in
order to promulgate an extremist and militant cult. Al-Qa’ida’s Wahhabist underpinnings are
compounded by the fact that many of the countries where they took root or who provided
material or financial support to the organization were themselves governed by fundamentalist
factions of Islam.
Why then, if al-Qa’ida is motivated by an aggregation of ideology and religion, did it not
suffer organizational dissolution or death when it experienced leadership decapitation in 2011?
The answer likely has to do with a third factor – the state-building aspirations inherent in the
ideology of al-Qa’ida. Usama bin Ladin’s expressed goal, delivered repeatedly in addresses, but
most thoroughly in his ‘Letter to the West’ in which he remarks that the fundamental objective of
his organization is to remove all takfir, secular, and western-influences from what the group
considers traditionally Muslim lands, and establish a new caliphate89. Thus the conflation of
theocratic, state-building (i.e. Separatism/Nationalism), and religion and ideology strengthen al87
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Qa’ida against leadership decapitation. Al-Qa’ida is bolstered by a desire shared by a
considerable enough majority to ensure that the arrest or death of leadership will not curtail the
ultimate desire of seeing the stated objective actualized.

Measuring Success & Effects

Figure 1.2 illustrates the terrorist operations carried out by all factions of al-Qa'ida,
beginning after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and ending exactly two years after the death of
Usama bin Ladin. Rather than al-Qa'ida’s operational capacity contracting, the evidence, as
provided by the matrix, suggests that this instance of leadership decapitation had an adverse
counter-terrorism effect, with the number of relatable incidents rising to approximately 500 a year
after bin Ladin’s death. At the time of his death in 2011, there were approximately 145 terrorist
incidents attributed to al-Qa’ida, worldwide. This figure represents a near 245% increase in the
number of al-Qa’ida-related attacks carried out globally in the short expanse of a year.
Controlling for other factors, the figure above suggests that
Figure 1.2. al-Qa’ida Incidents (7 Oct. 2001 – 31 Oct. 2013)90

years in operation

In the case of al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin, repeated expulsions and self-imposed
exiles worked to the benefit of the organization. Unlike Sendero Luminoso’s overt operations and
insertion into mainstream, Peruvian politics, al-Qa’ida operated clandestinely. Moving from state
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to state, bin Ladin established a network of contacts, supporters, and personnel who prioritized
‘listening ability, good manners, obedience, and making a bay’at pledge or to follow one's
superiors’, especially to bin Ladin himself91. Once the bay’at had been made, membership
became loosely based and largely autonomous, leaving only a tentative relationship with alQa'ida the organization.

This oath permitted al-Qa'ida to persist from the United Kingdom to the Philippine islands,
carrying out covert attacks on targets. Further, al-Qa'ida's extensive web of nodes exhibited itself
through its presence in over a forty-five nations92, particularly in the case of its early ties to
Hezbollah. On this, Michael Horowitz writes that ‘Bin Laden sent Al Qaeda operatives to
Hezbollah specifically for the purpose of learning how to execute [a suicide] attack like the U.S.
Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon’ 93. Al-Qa’ida's established connection with Hezbollah and
other terrorist organizations around the world were only instituted because of al-Qa’ida's
advanced, organizational age.
Abu Sayyaf – Abdurajak & Khadaffy Janjalani

The case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group represents the complexity of the interplay
between institutional dissolution and ‘reorienting’. Reorienting assures survival but undermines
the stated goals of the group, leading to a loss of local or political support. ASG demonstrated
that it placed a higher premium on acquiring treasure than pursuing the goal of a separate,
Islamic territory within the Philippines. Thus, repeated episodes of leadership decapitation had
mixed success in bringing about organizational death for ASG.
The group Abu Sayyaf or ‘Bearer of the Sword’ began as an offshoot of the significantly
larger Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). In 1991, The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or more
simply, Abu Sayyaf, was established by former MNLF council member, Abdurajik Abubakar
Janjalani who envisioned a more proactive, military solution to the establishment of an
independent, Islamic state within the Philippines94. Janjalani was a mujahadeen veteran of the
Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the 1980s, a fact which made him a particularly charismatic
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leadership figure among his followers in Abu Sayyaf. Janjalani mounted Abu Sayyaf’s first major
terrorist operation in 1995; an assault on the upscale town of Ipil on the island of Mindanao. The
raid involved a jailbreak operation in which Abu Sayyaf freed several prisoners from the
Philippine National Police headquarters, including Janjalani’s younger brother, Khadaffy
Janjalani.

In December of 1998, Abdurajak Janjalani was killed in a skirmish with Philippine
security forces on Basilan Island95. Following the death of his brother, Khadaffy Janjalani
assumed leadership of Abu Sayyaf but noticeably without the nationalistic and ideological
underpinnings of his late sibling. Under the younger Janjalani, Abu Sayyaf split into several
splinter groups that retained some loose central ties, but for the most part, sought to antagonize
the Philippine military and police apparatuses and to extort money from wealthy citizens and
tourists alike. As Audrey Cronin writes, Abu Sayyaf ‘became essentially a criminal organization,’
and ultimately caused the group to ‘[subsume] its political agenda to criminal greed’96. Greed did
not preclude Abu Sayyaf from continuing to target civilians in acts of terrorism for political ends.
The group’s attempted bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Manila was seen by security officials as
attempt to remove foreign, non-Muslim influence and to gain the recognition of al-Qa'ida, with
whom Abu Sayyaf already had a tentative alliance97. Increased terrorist activity by Abu Sayyaf
came with it a greater degree of attention from Filipino security forces. Khadaffy Janjalani was
himself killed in a police raid on an Abu Sayyaf stronghold in 2006.

Age
Abu Sayyaf, at the time or Abdurajak Janjalani’s death was a meager seven years old.
By the time his brother, Khadaffy, was also eliminated the group was slightly older, but still not
near enough the twenty-year marker for organizational resilience spoken of by many in
scholarship. As a young group, Abu Sayyaf should have likely experienced organizational
degradation or death. While the group itself did not collapse outright, it did degrade noticeably
in its terrorist activity after 1998 when Abdurajak Janjalani was killed. The group fractured into
three smaller factions, each of which no longer reported operations to Khadaffy nor sought his
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support. Further, the group’s political and religious goals were undermined by its subsequent
operations which only served to monetarily further the group.
The practice of ‘reorienting’ as Audrey Cronin refers to it, is critical in explaining why Abu
Sayyaf retracted in the wake of two episodes of decapitation without implosion. Like many
terrorist groups that experience leadership decapitation, Abu Sayyaf chose to suppress
unrealistic political ambitions for more practical ones. In this regard, the youth of Abu Sayyaf
had a hand in subverting political and religious agendas but did not cause an outright
organizational collapse. A measure of success is therefore clouded by Abu Sayyaf’s transition
to what is essentially a criminal organization and insurgency under the auspices of DAESH.
While Abu Sayyaf has very rarely committed recent acts of terrorism compared to its early days
under Abdurajak Janjalani, it is still engaged in kidnapping, extortion, racketeering, smuggling,
and the regional drug trade. By this measure it has not been operationally inactive for the
designated period of two years to declare it dissolved or dormant. Even more confounding is
Abu Sayyaf’s continued employment of Islamist Jihadist rhetoric, juxtaposed by actions that are
antithetical or uncommon for similar extremist groups.

Structure
Abu Sayyaf’s command structure is not well known to counter-terrorism specialists in the
region, but it is assumed to be paramilitary. It is clear that Abdurajak Janjalani had a powerful
command influence over his group, which is unsurprising given that he is accredited with its
formation. Similarly it was his familiarity with Islam and Islamic scholarship which gave him
standing and authority in the organization. However, the same could not be said of his younger
brother, Khadaffy. Again, as with age, it is difficult to discern to what extent the death of both
Janjalanis had a deleterious effect on Abu Sayyaf, as the organization did not imminently
dissolve, but reoriented.

The leader-apparent, Isnilon Hapilon, is not well known by counterterrorism leaders
except that he is a longtime member of the group. Abu Sayyaf can and should be understood as
hierarchically structured, however, because there are no parallel levels of authority with that of
the topmost commander. This would serve to explain why the religious underpinnings of Abu
Sayyaf were restrained when Abdurajak Janjalani was killed, due to being viewed as a military
and religious figure. No apparent diminishment or reorienting occurred after Khadaffy’s death
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however, because his authority was neither consolidated nor understood in terms of the group's
military, political, or religious motives. Leadership decapitation had a marginally deleterious
impact for Abu Sayyaf the first time it was experienced, however, because Khadaffy had not
cemented or consolidated power among the several factions of the group, his death had little
effect on halting the group.

Motivation
Abu Sayyaf’s motivation began as political and religious in nature, seeking to establish
an exclusively Salafist, Muslim province in the Philippine islands. This, however, was the stated
goal of the group in 1991. As of 2014, the group’s manifesto has remained largely unchanged
with the notable exception of an amendment to ‘obey [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] on anything which
our hearts desire...and to value him more than anyone else. We will not take any emir leader
other than him unless we see in him any obvious act of disbelief that could be questioned by
Allah in the hereafter’98. Still, the evidence gathered through action would suggest that Abu
Sayyaf is more profoundly motivated by financially furthering the group than by actually
changing the political system of the Philippines into an Islamic theocracy. Ergo, it remains
difficult to pinpoint the core motivation of Abu Sayyaf, sufficed to say that it has tenuous links to
its Islamist inception.
Abu Sayyaf’s religious and political motives likely meant that leadership decapitation had
a degrading, but not fatal impact on the organization. When Khadaffy Janjalani was killed in
2006, the motivation of the group was decentralized and varied from faction to faction.
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Measuring Success & Effects
Figure 1.3.1 Number of ASG Incidents (1991 – 2000)99

years in operation

Figure 1.3.1 demonstrates the number of terrorist incidents perpetrated by Abu Sayyaf
between 1991, when Abdurajak Janjalani formed the breakaway group, and 1998 when he was
assassinated by Filippino security forces. Included is an additional two years for observation of
ASG’s level of operational operability. The purpose of doing so, as stated in my introduction, is to
surmise whether a level of operability is maintained for a period of two years after leadership
decapitation, the two years being the determinant extent of time deemed by the State
Department for a terrorist group to be regarded as inoperable.

When Abdurajak was killed by Philippine security forces in 1998, the number of ASG
incidents was already trending upwards, according to the data from START. At the time of
Abdurajak Janjalani’s death, there were approximately 8 terrorist incidents linked to the ASG.
After the subsequent two years (i.e. the year 2000) the measure of time for determining
operability, the ASG was responsible for twice as many incidents per year as prior to Abdurajak’s
death. This information would suggest that rather slowing or halting ASG’s incident rate, in this
case, leadership decapitation had little impact on the group’s ability to carry out attacks. One
could attribute this steady increase of incidents to the timely leadership turnover that occurred
within the group, with Khadaffy immediately succeeding his late brother as leader.
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Figure 1.3.2 Number of ASG Incidents (1998 – 2008)100

years in operation
Figure 1.3.2 illustrates the number of incidents perpetrated by Abu Sayyaf between 1998,
when Khadaffy Janjalani assumed leadership from his deceased brother, and 2006, when
Khadaffy Janjalani himself was killed by Philippine security forces. Included is an additional two
years to test the group’s operational operability, post-leadership decapitation.

As in Figure 1.3.1, the initial data of Figure 1.3.2 highlights the increase in the number of
attributable terrorist incidents at the time of Abdurajak’s death in 1998. In spite of several
fluctuations in the number of incidents perpetrated by the group between 1998 and 2006 when
Khadaffy was killed, the group certainly was operational. Many of the dips and fluctuations in the
group’s level of attacks carried out, are likely due to the splintering of the group into three
factions, while Khadaffy remained the leader of Abu Sayyaf. However, at the time of Khadaffy’s
death in 2006, the number of incidents appears to have plateaued. That being said, the group
remained operational, and within the span of a year, its attack capability soared to over 20
incidents a year, far from being rendered operationally inert.

Leadership decapitation, both times it was experienced by Abu Sayyaf, caused a
systemic shift in the actions of the group. First, under Abdurajak Janjalani, Abu Sayyaf had
expressed the desire to see the emergence of an independent Islamic province within the
Philippines. However, following his death, the group separated into three factions, who at times
used Islamic separatist rhetoric, but whose actions suggested that opportunism and avarice
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were more potent catalysts for terrorist action than political or religious ideology. When, again,
Abu Sayyaf suffered from leadership decapitation with the death of Khadaffy Janjalani in 2006,
the group experienced another pivot in its focus. As of 2014, Abu Sayyaf, under the apparent
leadership of a senior commander named Isnilon Hapilon, swore a bay’at or allegiance to Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi and DAESH.

The interest in collaborating with or allying itself with DAESH reflects another potential
change in the interests of Abu Sayyaf. The group had previously sought support from al-Qa'ida
in 2002 from fear that the resurgence of U.S. military in the Philippines was signally a return of
permanent military instalments which had not existed in the region since 1992. In 2014, Abu
Sayyaf faces new targeting measures by Philippine security forces, in the form of counterinsurgency. As it did in 2002, Abu Sayyaf looks to ally itself with the most powerful (terrorist)
actor who is in a position to provide support nominally or in the form of solidarity, rather than
materially. The bay’at sworn to al-Baghdadi, should be viewed in a similar way; not as a literal
alliance with mutual exchange of information, practices, and funds, but to inspire fear and
pause in the counterterrorism system that hunts them and to opportunistically enhance their
own regional clout. There is scant evidence that any intelligence, money, or logistical methods
have been either disseminated from DAESH to Abu Sayyaf or shared between the two101.
Monetary, self-interest prevailed – and continues to prevail – over the activities of the group. As
such, the group will continue to be able to attract young, disenfranchised, and disaffected
Filipinos, for whom poverty and the under-representation of Muslims in the Philippines is a call
to terrorism and crime.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – Velupillai Prabhakaran & Tamil Leadership

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam provide a case study for the susceptibility of large
terrorist organizations to leadership decapitation. Further, the case of the LTTE demonstrates
the significance of repressive counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency measures in their ability
to demolish a terrorist organization, regardless of other prevailing factors, such as popular
support, size, and funding. Most notably, the execution of any and all likely successors to LTTE
leadership prevented as resurgence of the group, in spite of levels of local support.
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Formed in 1976 from a social project by university students, The Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a sprawling, diasporic terrorist insurgency that occupied large portions
of Sri Lankan territory for nearly thirty years. With one of the largest memberships of any such
organization – at its zenith, approximately 18,000 members102 – the LTTE received steady
popular support from ethnic Tamils who, through a number of state-run programs, felt
increasingly socially and politically underrepresented. The charismatic Velupillai Prabhakaran
formed the LTTE at the age of eighteen, originally keeping the group’s numbers small while
maintaining a high standard of military-style training for his members. Prabhakaran established
a formidable stronghold in the Wanni region of Sri Lanka off the Indian coast. Prabhakaran also
managed to institute an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any
outsiders who entered the group's territorial control.

The LTTE grew to prominence and to the attention of terrorism experts when in 1983,
the group staged an assault on a convoy of Sri Lankan military personnel, killing a dozen
soldiers. Largely in response to this attack, Sinhalese rioters across the country staged brutal
riots in which Tamils were beaten, raped, and murdered by the hundreds in an episode that
became known as Black July103. The aftermath of these riots and the government intervention
instituted to quell them began the Sri Lankan Civil War. After the failed intercession of the Indian
army in order to curtail the internecine violence, a 2001 peace process was also unsuccessful in
bringing about a lasting resolution to the conflict. When the LTTE consistently violated the
ceasefire ordinance, the Sri Lankan army launched a major military incursion into Jaffna
province in 2006 to dismantle and defeat the Tamil Tigers. In 2009, Prabhakaran and a majority
of the LTTE leadership and militants were killed during a weeks-long firefight with the military104.

Age

Almost exceeding the twenty-year marker for organizational resilience, the LTTE should
have built up adequate defence against the systemic leadership decapitation it experienced in
2001 and 2009. The LTTE’s longevity had afforded it the advantages of territorial entrenchment
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of nearly 5,800 square miles at its strongest105, a strong command structure, familiarity and
regional support from Tamil civilians, powerful armaments and defence, and the prestige of
having survived multiple incursions and a civil war with the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE
was also able to effectively consolidate resources and external support from international actors
to support its operations for many years. Similarly, part of the reason the LTTE survived as long
as it had was perhaps due to its strategic usage of its political branch to generate ceasefires
and peace talks during which time it would plan and stage assaults as well as acts of terrorism.
Given the LTTE’s significant advancement in age, why was it not able to withstand
leadership decapitation? The LTTE had survived the loss of three major, organizational leaders
in less than a decade; first, Vaithilingam Sornalingam (alias, Colonel Shankar) in 2001, S. P.
Tamilselvan in 2007, and ultimately the founder and longtime leader of the LTTE, Velupillai
Prabhakaran, in 2009. The advanced age of the LTTE could not shield it from the all out
repressive incursion instituted by the SASF in 2007 and more thoroughly in 2009 when the
group was routed and thereafter declared operationally inactive. As Audrey Cronin writes,
‘Indiscriminate, retaliatory police or military force used in a frontal assault, at home or abroad,
may set back a movement. Overwhelming – and unscrupulous – use of force may even
obliterate groups using terror tactics’106. The LTTE’s age came with it a degree of
bureaucratisation, as suggested by some in scholarship (footnote). However, the age and
bureaucratized structure of the group, did not allow for an easy leadership transition as Jenna
Jordan suggested. This may be partly due to these separation of different branches of operation
within the LTTE, or possibly the wholesale execution of all likely successors. Still, the fact that
no attempt was made to name a successive leader indicates that age does not always carry
with it a thorough formulation of bureaucratization.

Further, repressive counter-insurgency measures were successful in the case of the
LTTE because of the marrying of several factors unique to this case study. First, the isolated,
island nature of the area occupied by the LTTE meant that when the Sri Lankan military
unseated them, it was relatively easy to both prevent wanted LTTE members from leaving the
area, as well as new recruits from entering. Second, all attempts to reconstitute the group had
been quelled by an aggressive military posture which reacted to the breakdown of prior peacetalks with the LTTE. Third, the authoritarian system of government in place in Sri Lanka issued
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the military a carte blanche in its directive to dismantle the group, in ways that would have likely
impeded the militaries of democratic states. Fourth, there was a strong, international, political
incentive to represent the Tamil population in Sri Lanka for almost thirty years, especially among
Swedish parliament. This meant that there was a viable opportunity for Tamil civil rights to
become a reality without incorporating violence into the cause. Lastly, the wholesale execution
of LTTE leaders, secondary and tertiary leadership, potential leaders, and in some cases, their
sons or daughters for fear that they will seek revenge, coupled with the offer of amnesty to
former Tamil Tiger members, meant that the group had little opportunity to consolidate what
remained of itself.

Structure

As its original founder, Prabhakaran was the undisputed head of the LTTE and
structured the organization – when it was the New Tigers and combined with the Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) – in a hierarchical system. Although Prabhakaran was indicted by
Interpol on several counts of terrorism, homicide, rape, conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism,
assassinating a public figure, and organized crime107 he was also well revered domestically by
native Tamils and those Indians sympathetic to the Tamil cause who saw him as a liberation
figure. Prabhakaran was personally responsible for orchestrating, instrumenting, supplying, and
sometimes participating in acts of terrorism, primarily aimed at SASF and the Indian military. As
such, Prabhakaran was both operationally and ideologically imperative to the functionality of the
LTTE.

Prabhakaran often softened his local image by attending memorial services for Black
Tiger members – the elite suicide unit of the LTTE – and was seen consoled widows and
parents108. This familiar and paternal image, allowed Prabhakaran to turn a blind eye to the
more unscrupulous and savage behavior of his cohort. Thus, Prabhakaran could permit acts of
terrorism and worse by his members, while projecting the image of an ideologically sensitive
leader. Because of this dynamic, Prabhakaran remained largely unchallenged by any rivals to
his authority, which in turn, made him a prime target for a kingpin strategy. In turn,
Prabhakaran’s singular importance to the LTTE would justify the effectiveness of leadership
decapitation in curtailing the activities of the LTTE. Still, Prabhakaran made no discernible effort
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to name or groom a replacement, in the event of leadership decapitation resulting in his removal
or death. This, in combination with the fact that most potential candidates for his replacement
were also killed in the three yearlong raid on LTTE strongholds, meant that there was little
chance of a succession of leadership and even less chance that the organization would long
endure.

Motivation
The LTTE’s internal motivation from the outset has been to urge ‘The Tamil Nation in
general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully in the sacred
fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is reached’109.
Thus, the LTTE can safely be designated as being motivated by a nationalist-separatist agenda.
According to the theory, the group should not have experienced organizational death in the
wake of leadership decapitation because the underlying impetus for employing terrorism was
larger than the group itself, namely, equitable treatment and recognition of Sri Lankan Tamils
realized through independence. In spite of the repressive measures ultimately used to defeat
the LTTE, Audrey Cronin writes:
The strategic dynamic is not between states and “nonstate actors”...The
core of the relationship is between states and communities that are
competing over the capacity to mobilize support, and it is success or
failure in that dimension which ultimately determines whether or not
repression ends terrorism. 110
Given Cronin’s assessment, it becomes clear as why the LTTE itself was thoroughly
destroyed, but the urgency for the state-assured rights of Tamils is still heavily in the public and
political sectors. Public support remains high for Tamil issues remains high, however, the
consolidating focus of the LTTE no longer exists to channel that ethnic self-interest into acts of
violence or intense, political action. In the case of the LTTE, the national-separatist motivation of
the group accounts for its strong membership, local support, and ability to mount assaults.
However, these factors were undercut by the intense, repressive intervention of the Sri Lankan
military.
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Measuring Success & Effects

The LTTE did not suffer a slow, grinding demise like those experienced by many terrorist
organizations in decline. Many terrorist groups have suffered repeated and successive
leadership decapitation without experiencing organizational death, like Volya, al-Qa'ida, and the
Caucasus Emirate, for example. So, why did the LTTE collapse so thoroughly?

The repressive measures utilized by the Sri Lankan government in the final assault
operation on the LTTE stronghold between 2006 and 2009 led to the swift degradation of the
group. Cronin has consistently noted that repressive measures are usually capable of ending a
terrorist organization. However, Cronin recommends that government and militaries avoid such
measures given the propensity for them to have unforeseeable, secondary effects that can
harm the effort to undermine the group’s ideology. It is clear that repression worked in the case
of the LTTE, as it is one of the truly, organizationally dead groups examined in this paper.
Figure 1.4 LTTE Incidents from 1983 – 2009111

years in operation
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Figure 1.4 exhibits the number of incidents perpetrated by the LTTE between 1983 when
the group first militarized, and 2009 when Prabhakaran and most of his leadership was killed in a
firefight with the Sri Lankan government.

Figure 1.4 highlights the impressive capability of repression as a counter-terrorism tool.
Although the number of incidents committed by the LTTE was already appearing to trend
downwards by 2006, when the Sri Lankan government began a campaign to eradicate the LTTE
and its senior leadership in 2009, the number of incidents takes a noticeably sharper downturn.
By 2010, there are few to no incidents attributable to the LTTE. The total removal of all, viable
leadership replacements, as well as the arrest or execution of low-level LTTE operatives meant
that there was no one in a position to coordinate or carry out acts of terrorism, a fact
demonstrated by the data in Figure 1.4.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – Abdullah Ocalan
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party or Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan’s (PKK) leader, Abdullah
Ocalan, formed the group while studying Political Science at university in Ankara, Turkey in
1974. The PKK provides a reasonable case for the vulnerability of hierarchically structured,
ideologically motivated terrorist groups to decapitation strikes. The import of these factors made
it possible for Turkish, government forces to effectively dismantle the PKK subsequent to
Ocalan’s arrest.
The PKK under Ocalan maintained the vision of inciting a ‘bottom-up’ revolution not
dissimilar to that of Sendero Luminoso. During the PKK’s so-called ‘First Phase’, Ocalan hoped
to oppose what he perceived as a domineering, Turkish state and in so doing, establish a
sovereign, Kurdish state encompassing various regions of Turkey and Iraq112. The PKK arose as
communist-socialist institution, whose structure strongly resembled that of a more traditional,
political party. Internally, the PKK was governed by a General Secretary as well as a Party
Assembly which served to legitimize the organization and win popular favor among Kurds.
Ocalan’s popularity within the PKK, Turkey and among European Kurds grew throughout the late
1970s, earning him the nickname of ‘Apo’ or uncle. Ocalan’s extensive base of support garnered
substantial financial and political support for the PKK, which Ocalan utilized to fund assaults,
intimidations and assassinations of individuals, – both non-Kurds and Kurds – invite violent
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demonstrations, and acts of sabotage, aimed at undermining the authority of the Turkish
government.

The violent unrest in Turkey culminated in the 1980 military coup that ousted the
provisional, civilian government, instituted martial law within Turkish borders, outlawed political
parties and trade unions, abolished the Turkish Parliament, and suspended the constitution. By
the time of the military coup d’etat, Ocalan had already left Turkey and was residing in Syria.
Ocalan remained abroad, managing the activities of the PKK in absentia, first from Syria, then
Lebanon, Russia, Italy, and Greece. 1984 saw the birth of the 'Second Phase' of PKK operations
in Turkey, with a markedly more bloody agenda. The PKK's renewed campaign for a Kurdish
state cost the lives of approximately 35,000 people over the course of fifteen years. Audrey
Cronin notes that the PKK began 'attacking rural areas', intimidating, torturing, and often
executing detractors while fomenting a popular coalition among supporters and eventually
targeting urban areas in traditional, Maoist fashion.

Ocalan was apprehended in Kenya in 1999 while being transported from the Greek
embassy to the Nairobi international airport. Members of the Turkish, National Intelligence
Organization or MIT, under information from the Central Intelligence Agency, carried out an
operation that captured the political dissident and abruptly placed him on an unregistered flight
out of the country113. Ocalan's subsequent trial was extraordinarily protracted and ended with the
judge rendering a death sentence which was later commuted to life when Turkey abolished the
death penalty in 2002. The public outpouring of disdain at the sentence manifested in the form of
protracted, violent protests among Kurds in London, Berlin, and Israel. In response the
demonstrations, Ocalan encouraged his proponents to abstain from acts of violence – especially
in his namesake – and the PKK's campaign of violence and terrorism sharply declined before
halting altogether by 2002.

Age
At the time of Ocalan’s apprehension in 1999, the PKK was less than one year shy of its
twentieth anniversary. For the purposes of this assessment, I will treat the PKK as a terrorist
group that has achieved the twenty-year marker given that several months of existence under
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Ocalan’s governance would likely not have made an appreciable difference in the group’s level
of organizational resilience. If the PKK achieved the age marker for resilience, why did it collapse
after the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan? I contend that the nature of the PKK leadership, particularly
the singular authority of Ocalan, was a more prominent factor in the operational functionality of
the PKK than advantages likely afforded by age. Not unlike Shining Path’s leadership structure
under Abimael Guzman, Ocalan’s sole command of the PKK, did not allow for the normal
practices inherent in bureaucratization to take place, such as the appointment of a replacement.
That is to say, the normal organizational strengths afforded by age were undermined because of
Ocalan’s reluctance to delegate authority. This proved a stronger factor in defining the
parameters of the PKK than bureaucratization, and accounts for the organizational degradation
of the PKK after Ocalan’s arrest.

Structure
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party was particularly vulnerable to leadership decapitation
because of its hierarchical structure. Because of its aspirations for political legitimacy as an
active party within the greater Turkish Parliament, the organization structured itself like any other
politically affiliated party. However, because their activities were more in line with an insurgency
or terrorist organization, the PKK was ill-suited to survive a decapitation strike. While Ocalan’s
removal did not create a leadership vacuum that more traditional, hierarchically structured,
terrorist groups are likely to suffer from – because of the group’s bureaucratized, political party
structure – he was the primary form for which violence was rationalized in furtherance of the
cause of Kurdish autonomy, thus making his removal more potent in ending the PKK’s use of
violence.

In 2003, the PKK regrouped and rebranded itself under a new name, the Kongra-Gel or
KGK, and made a vow of only engaging in political activism on behalf of Kurds. Subsequent to
his arrest and trial, acts of violence and terrorism attributed to the PKK declined sharply, due in
part to a five-year, ceasefire agreement between the Turkish government and the PKK/KGK.
Ocalan, referred to as ‘Apo’ or uncle, in the style of Maoist, people’s revolutions, headed
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party from its inception and sanctioned some of its most bloody
atrocities. The singular authority that Ocalan represented for the PKK – metonymic of both the
ethnic struggle of Kurds as well as its long struggle for legitimacy – made his removal especially
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devastating for the PKK’s capacity to carry out acts of violence. In the case of the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, leadership decapitation severely undermined the efficacy of the group by
‘[emphasizing] the rule of law, [profiling] leaders as criminals, and [demonstrating] the rule of law’
114

.

Motivation

For the PKK, its bottom-up vision for Turkish society as well as its political aspirations
were both its greatest source of viability, and its most profound weakness. The regional support
from Kurds in aid of the PKK came from their underrepresentation by the Turkish government
and Turkish civil society. Ocalan’s vision of a Marxist system was the driving ideological
foundation for the PKK, and justified its use of terrorism, extortion, kidnapping, and
assassination. I label the PKK an ideological organization, more than any other factor, given that
it’s primary goal was the establishment of a Communist political system in Turkey for the
representation of ethnic Kurds, while only later did the notion of an independent Kurdistan. To
this end, the purpose of the PKK’s desire to establish an independent Kurdistan was, in fact, to
implement a Marxist system of governance over the newly established region. Given this, and
that the impetus for the creation of the PKK was Marxist communism, I discern the prevailing
motivation as ideological.

Measuring Success & Effects

Figure 1.5 represents the number of terrorist incidents attributed to the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party from 1984 – shortly after the beginning of the so-called ‘Second Phase’ of the
group – until 2002 when the group reformulated itself and agreed to a ceasefire. Shown in Figure
1.5 is a noticeable flatlining of PKK activity after Ocalan’s arrest in 1999. By 2002, there are
virtually no violent incidents attributable to the PKK. Controlling for other factors such as the
destabilizing military coup or lack of successor, the PKK represents a clear case of when
leadership decapitation is effective in stemming terrorism.
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Figure 1.5 PKK Incidents (1984 – 2002)115

years in operation

One effect that can be discerned from this evidence is that hierarchically structured
groups, such as those that emerge from political parties and maintain a like-minded
organizational structure, are more likely to rebrand themselves in the wake of leadership
decapitation. Although Jenna Jordan, in ‘Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark’, argues that
organizational resilience in the form of steady bureaucratization correlative with size and age of
terrorist groups works against the success of leadership decapitation116, bureaucratization
carries with it the possibility for legitimacy. Just as the PKK renamed and reorganized itself in
2003 – first as the KADEK and then as the KGK – hierarchically structured, terror groups have a
vested interest in maintaining any form of legitimacy, if not as a militant-political institution, then
as a reborn political party with an unscrupulous past.

The African National Congress (ANC), for example, formed a military branch in 1961 and
began targeting government facilities, South African military and foreign businesses in an effort
to alter or halt the practice of apartheid. When President F.W. de Klerk promised greater
inclusivity of black Africans in politics, much of the practice of terrorism by the ANC ceased. In
1990, the ANC became a South African, political party, with party member, Nelson Mandela,
elected as President of South Africa in 1994. Similar instances include the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA), which used terror tactics to protect ethnic Albanians from Serbian-led genocide in
Kosovo. Subsequent to U.S. military intervention on behalf the Albanians, the KLA rebranded
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itself as the Kosovo Protection Corps, allying itself with NATO. Because legitimacy is the
foremost currency on the international stage, a group like the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, so
structured, was forced to weigh organizational survival against its methodology. In this case,
foregoing a history of violence was preferable to dissolution of the party and abandoning the
cause of Kurdish independence in what Audrey Cronin refers to as ‘reorienting’ 117.
The Caucasus Emirate (CE) – Dokka Umarov & Chechen Leadership

The case of the Caucasus Emirate demonstrates the resilience of terrorist organizations
who enjoy a conglomeration of large bases of regional, popular support, a diffused leadership
structure, and who can rationalize anti-state acts of violence and simultaneously galvanize local
support by enduring repressive, government counter-terrorism measures. In spite of the loss of
nearly every leader the CE has known – most to assassination, but some by apprehension – the
group endures for the reasons mentioned above, in addition to religious homogeneity
underpinning its acts of violence.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many territories that had previously
been under Russian authority were now seeking autonomous statehood. Included in this number
were predominantly Sufi, Muslim, Chechen nationals who conglomerated to form the Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria (CHRI). Two armed conflicts throughout the close of the twentieth-century
resulted in an extended, Chechen insurgency against the Russian Federation’s military. Russia’s
policy of targeted killings resulted in the deaths of many of the separatist leaders, leaving a crisis
of leadership from which the more fundamentalist Salafi faction of Chechens rose to
prominence. It was into this tumultuous environment that Dokka Khamatovich Umarov
consolidated authority, becoming the President of Ichkeria in 2006. A year later, as an expansion
of his earlier movement for a sovereign Chechen state in Russian territory, Umarov established
the Imarat Kavkaz or Caucasus Emirate (CE).

The provincial branches of the Caucasus Emirate have demonstrated a preference for
suicide type attacks aimed at inciting terror among Russians. Chechen separatists linked with
the CE – and often at the behest of Umarov – have been connected with the 2004 suicide
bombings of Russian passenger planes, a dual bombing of the Nevsky Express, high-speed
train in 2009, the bombing of the Moscow Metro in 2010, the Domodedovo International Airport
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bombing in 2011, twin suicide bombings of a police checkpoint in Makhachkala (Dagestan) in
2012, the suicide bombing of a public transport bus in Volgograd in 2013, and the suicide
bombing at Grozny City Hall in 2014 along with the prolonged firefight against security forces
that ensued. The Russian FSB match the Chechen separatists' brutal tactics, measure for
measure with the 'most aggressive [campaign] of assassinating leaders of violent militant groups'
in modern history118. The loose association of jama'ats, or Islamic fundamentalist insurgent
groups, that comprise the Caucasus Emirate report periodically on activities during the majilis alshura gatherings, but rarely act in concert, if only to repel Russian incursions.

In July of 2013, Umarov and the majilis al-shura officially reversed a moratorium on
targeting civilians during attacks, telling Chechen operatives to utilize ‘maximum force’ against all
those present at the upcoming, 2014 Winter Olympics being held in the Russian city of Sochi
with the goal of ‘[disrupting]...these satanic games’119. In the aftermath of the December 2013,
dual suicide bombings in Volgograd, and a subsequent attack in Pyatigorsk, President Vladimir
Putin was incentivised to prevent any acts of terrorism during or targeting the Sochi games. The
renewed vigor of Russian security forces came in the form of several operations in Dagestan
that left over thirty Caucasus Emirate combatants dead between December 2013 and January
2014. While the timeline remains unclear, in March of 2014, the CE announced Umarov’s death
by poisoning in an online posting and Aliaskhab Kebekov was named the new emir. Kebekov
would later be assassinated by Russian FSB forces in April of 2015.

Age

Established in 2007, the CE had not arrived at the twenty-year standard for
organizational resilience to leadership decapitation. The group was a mere six years old at the
time of Umarov’s death. Given this fact, the theory of youth being a contributing factor to the
deleteriousness of terrorist groups must question why, in spite of young age, the CE did not
collapse or weaken. A counter-theory is predicated upon the actual, arguable age of the CE.
Consider that the CE is a breakaway terrorist organization, borne out of two wars for Chechen
independence and consolidated and separated during an already long-underway, Chechen
insurgency. With this in mind, the CE had already accumulated a vast wealth of local support
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from Chechen populations endeared to the CE by an indiscriminate, Russian counterinsurgency, battle-hardened CE members who had participated in lengthy, armed skirmishes
with Russian army and FSB personnel, and who were united by a shared religion – Salafi Islam.
Normally, indecisive terrorist attacks, internal struggle, government-led counter-measures, and a
lack of insular structuring are indicative of young terrorist organizations. However, in the case of
the CE, none of these factors could be said to be true of the organization, thus making youth a
less-than-decisive factor in determining the group’s vulnerability to leadership decapitation.

Structure

Declaring himself the first emir of the Caucasus Emirate, Umarov set up a ruling,
consultative body – or majilis al-shura – from all portions of the organization. The membership of
consultative body was representative of six or seven different wilayah, or provinces, from the
Black Sea to the Caspian. However, as of 2011, five of the seven governing members of the
Caucasus Emirate had either been imprisoned or assassinated by Russian security forces.
Because the Caucasian Emirate is dispersed in this manner across several provincial areas
throughout Chechnya, the leadership itself is mostly self-regulating, with Umarov providing
religious directives, the ability to instigate attacks on particular targets, and maintain the power to
call a council meeting of the majilis al-shura.
Because Umarov’s role as emir was largely nominal and his death contained, it did little
to dissolve or destroy the operational capacity of any wilayah under the control of the Caucasus
Emirate. Authority and the autonomy to carry out acts of terrorism came mostly from within the
wilayah responsible, thus targeting leadership as the FSB did, even simultaneously, proved
largely ineffective. To this end, the same announcement issued by the Caucasus Emirate
website declaring Umarov’s death in 2014, also declared the succession of his replacement,
Aliaskhab Kebekov. Dear, in Beheading the Hydra, remarks that terrorist leadership is being
‘killed on an industrial scale’, adding that ‘insurgent...cells are being relentlessly “decapitated” by
targeted strikes, but...the insurgents [are] more numerous than ever’120. Dear's pronouncement
is supported by the case study of the CE, who, because of diffuse authority across an 800 mile
expanse of territory and invariable ability to carry out attacks and survive counter-insurgency
attempts, has repeatedly proven resilient in the face of leadership decapitation.
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Motivation

Like many terrorist organizations examined for this study, there are several overlapping,
motivational factors contributing to the impetus for violence. As mentioned in the case study of
al-Qa’ida, Salafi Islam is considered an ultra-conservative form of Islam that is often
characterized by a desire to remove non-Islamic influences from regions where the sect is in
practice. Groups that declare themselves as Salafi or Wahhabi often incorporate violence to
achieve these ends. That being said, in the case of the CE, national-separatism is the primary
goal of the group, which, rather than being driven by a specific religious directive, endeavors for
the sovereign, geographic space in which to implement these religious practices.

Separation from the greater Russian Federation being the ultimate goal of the CE, the
terrorist organization has gained significant local support from native Chechens. Given the
wealth of this internal support, across a broad region of territory, in it unsurprising that leadership
decapitation was unsuccessful in dissolving or destroying the CE. The separatist-nationalist
motivation of the CE, cross-cuts with the religious majority of regional Chechens who share
Islam as their religion. These factors in tandem provide a viable illustration for the
unsuccessfulness of leadership decapitation against the CE.

Measuring Success & Effects

The death of Dokka Umarov retains enough circumstantial doubt to galvanize the
Caucasus Emirate to further action. Given Putin’s vow for the ‘total annihilation’121 of the
terrorists responsible for the 2013 Volgograd bombings, the renewed targeting of Chechen
separatists in and around the time of Umarov’s death, and the FSB's – and its methodologically
indiscernible predecessor, the KGB's – extended history of using poisoning as a means of
assassinating political dissidents, it is not unreasonable to assume that the premier emir of the
Caucasian Emirate met his demise at the hands of the Federal Security Service.

Consider that poisoning has long been a preferred method of dispatching Russian
enemies of state. Russian security forces have assassinated individuals through the clandestine
use of poisons before; including, for example, Thamir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailem – better
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known by his nom de guerre, Ibn al-Khattab – in 2002.122 A profound, logical leap would not be
required to evaluate Umarov’s death – by poisoned food he had ingested – as another probable
assassination by Russian, security forces with a preferred weapon of choice.
Figure 1.6 Caucasus Emirate Incidents (2007–2014)123

years in operation

Figure 1.6 demonstrates the number of terrorist incidents attributed to the Caucasian
Emirate from the time of its inception in 2007 until the current date. The data set represented in
Figure 1.6 can draw tentative conclusions about this instance of leadership decapitation. The
evidence provided by Figure 1.6 also demonstrates the potency of suicide terrorism as indicated
by Pape in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. In it, Pape remarks that
groups that incorporate suicide terrorism, as the Caucasus Emirate did, have a limited 'human
capital' with regards to operatives who can conduct suicide bombings. However, the strategic
implications of this limited, human capital has its advantages – namely with the number of
casualties a suicide bomber can inflict with a single attack.

Given the sparse number of terrorism incidents for which the Caucasus Emirate took
responsibility in its eight-year life-span – totalling less than fifty – the damage done by highcasualty attacks is apparent. However, as Pape suggested, this relatively small number of
incidents belies the high number of casualties inflicted – approximately 1,800 dead and 3,000
injured. Further, beginning in 2012, the number of terror incidents for which the Caucasus
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Emirate has taken responsibility has risen and continues to rise with each year, undeterred by
the deaths of Umarov, Kebekov and other leaders of provincial jama'ats.
Finally, the Caucasus Emirate’s diasporic structure has proven particularly resilient to
counter-insurgency tactics because of what Audrey Cronin describes as the inherent fault with
extreme, ‘repressive’ counter-terrorism policy. The author writes:

Repression alone seldom ends terrorism because terrorist groups resort to
strategies designed to turn a state’s strength against itself. Indiscriminate,
retaliatory police or military force used in a frontal assault, at home or
abroad, may set back a movement. Overwhelming – and unscrupulous – use
of force may even obliterate groups using terror tactics. But it may be a
pyrrhic victory. If the ideas that are the source of popular mobilization persist,
repression will be temporary, even counterproductive. 124

Compounded by the fact, as Cronin writes, the success of a repressive counter-terrorism or
counter-insurgency policy is largely dependent upon the competition ‘between states and
communities...over the capacity to mobilize support’, Russian aggression is engaged in a
sisyphean struggle. When considering the large territory under the CE’s authority, the diffuse or
horizontal leadership structure therein, and the integrated wilayah that comprise them, the
failure of this instance of leadership decapitation becomes somewhat more self-evident125.

Among the discernable, typological effects that emerge from the case study of Umarov
and the CE: When states engage in repressive counter-terrorism measures – with regards to a
horizontally-structured organization – leading to the removal of a leader or leaders, a new
leader will emerge expeditiously. The CE’s base of power exists in a vast insurgency, protected
not only be Salifist, jihadist operatives, but by the existing population seeking legitimacy through
statehood, the hydra-like emergence of new leadership is unsurprising. As Robert Pape
suggests, when a community views an occupying force as both culturally and religiously
foreign, the domestic population is far more likely to incorporate suicide attacks in expelling the
perceived, foreign element126. This would account for the CE’s extensive use of suicide
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bombing attacks throughout the entirety of its existence. The diffuse nature of leadership within
the CE’s several provincial wilayah also helps to explain the readiness with which new
leadership emerges, given that autonomy among the wilayah is guaranteed and constraints are
shared by the majilis al-shura, and not a singular leadership figure.

Aum Shinrikyo (オウム真理教) – Shoko Asahara

Aum Shinrikyo offers a unique case study in the results of leadership decapitation on a
terrorist group whose primary motivation is religious in nature. Leadership decapitation appears
to have been successful in the case of Aum Shinrikyo due to the overlapping of several factors,
including the timely arrest and prosecution of its leader, Shoko Asahara, the clear hierarchical
structure of the group and its reliance on Asahara, as well as the offer of state-sanctioned
reprieves for members who provided intelligence on the group. The organizational death of
Aum Shinrikyo was furthered by its belief in an apocalyptic scenario which its increasing
violence both fed into and likewise caused it to become increasingly erratic subsequent to
Asahara’s arrest.
Aum Shinrikyo, which has since rebranded itself as ‘Aleph’, is a religious cult established
in 1987 by Chizuo Matsumoto – better known as Shoko Asahara. The clinically blind, former
pharmacologist had begun studying esoteric mysticism and Chinese taoism in the early 1980s.
By the end of the decade, Asahara had allegedly become obsessed with Biblical, apocalyptic
prophecy, combining themes from the Book of Daniel and Revelations with more eclectic
teachings from Hinduism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Chinese taoism into what he dubbed Aum
Shinrikyo, or ‘Supreme Truth’. In 1989, Aum Shinrikyo gained religious, organizational status
with the Japanese government127. Believing that the United States would soon bring about a
third, global war with the use of nuclear weapons targeting Japan, Aum Shinrikyo sought to
preemptively initiate Armageddon. In so doing, Asahara and his cabal would be at an
advantage of establishing a new world order out of the post-apocalyptic chaos.

Aum Shinrikyo drew scrutiny early on from the public and governments alike through its
unorthodox initiation rituals which often involved the ingestion of LSD or hallucinogenic
mushrooms, and the involuntary administration of ECT (Electroconvulsive Therapy). The
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Japanese government began closely observing the practises of Asahara in 1989 when a former
member was found murdered after attempting to leave the group.
From 1990 to 1991, Asahara unsuccessfully lobbied for Aum Shinrikyo’s admittance into
Japan’s House of Representatives. With this failure, Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo’s Construction
Minister issued a ‘declaration of war’ against the Japanese constitution and its government.
Throughout 1993, Aum members made repeated trips to Russia where they purchased
substantial amounts of military hardware, including assault rifles, a military helicopter, and
components for a nuclear weapon128. Former members have mentioned that between 1991 and
1993, Aum Shinrikyo compiled an 'assassination list' which included those critical of the cult or
whose views were seen as threatening the integrity of the group. By this time in 1993, the group
had began the illicit manufacture of Sarin and VX compounds. Aum Shinrikyo members used
VX to assassinate a dozen detractors and civilians alike from 1994 to 1995.

Aum Shinrikyo had amassed a sizable arsenal of weaponized, chemical agents which,
according to Charles Townshend, had the potential ‘to kill over four million people’129. On 20
March 1995, several members of Aum Shinrikyo boarded trains at five stations along the Tokyo
subway system. The cult members released Sarin concealed in wadded newspaper by pricking
the packaged agent with sharpened umbrellas while aboard various Tokyo trains. The incident
killed thirteen people while injuring another fifty. Following the terrorist attack on the Tokyo
subway, the Public Security Intelligence agency conducted simultaneous raids targeting Aum
compounds across the country, and arresting multiple cult members. The raids also revealed
that Aum Shinrikyo had been producing LSD and Methamphetamine as well as stockpiling VX,
Anthrax, Ebola and more Sarin cultures which were being prepared for biological weaponization
in clandestine laboratories.

Asahara was found hiding in secret room within the walls of a remote compound known
as the Kamishuishiki Complex or ‘Sixth Satian’ and promptly arrested. Asahara was indicted on
twenty-three counts of homicide in 1995 and remained in prison until he was sentenced to
death in 2004. Asahara's death sentence has been repeatedly postponed, most recently in
2012, due to further arrests.
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Age

When Asahara was arrested by Japanese authorities in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo had
existed approximately eight years. The group continued on under the name ‘Aum Shinrikyo’ for
several years, but due to public derision and continued attention from Japanese security, the
group split in 2007. From 1999 to 2007 there were no recorded incidents of violence or
terrorism attributable to Aum Shinrikyo. Whether we choose to measure Aum Shinrikyo’s
demise from Asahara’s arrest (1995) or it’s last act of terrorism (1999), Aum Shinrikyo did not
reach the age benchmarks for organizational resilience.

Without reaching the twenty-year milestone, Aum Shinrikyo did not attain the degree of
organizational resilience traceable to more bureaucratized, and older terror groups. Aum relied
heavily on internal support, fear, and wealthy foreign and domestic donors to continually
stimulate the group, while ignoring the factors that make bureaucratized groups more
successful.

Structure

At no point during the establishment and the promulgation of Aum Shinrikyo had
Asahara shared authority or made structural contingencies to abdicate authority in his absence.
That being said, Aum Shinrikyo – considered by authorities a religious cult – maintained
varying, organizational rungs wherein different members were privileged with varying amounts
of operational information on the group’s activities. With this in mind, and Asahara’s
indisputable position as leader, one can establish that Aum Shinrikyo operated as a strictly
hierarchical organization, with a stated chain of command.

Following the path of the theory on structure, the hierarchical structure of Aum Shinrikyo,
particularly Asahara’s responsibility for providing Aum Shinrikyo with ideological direction, and
designating targets for attack, made it more probable that his removal would trigger the
dissolution of Aum. In this instance, a kingpin strategy was well-suited to remove Asahara,
leaving his group potent but directionless. In the coming weeks and months subsequent his
arrest, Aum Shinrikyo promptly unravelled with Asahara at the helm. Another likely that
Asahara’s removal had such a profound effect for Aum Shinrikyo was the mode of leadership
decapitation that removed him. By arresting Asahara, as opposed to lethal targeting, Japanese
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authorities were able to deflate the notion that Asahara was the Christ-like figure he likened
himself to, but rather, a criminal, prosecutable by law.

Motivation

Religiously motivated, terrorist organisations such as Aum Shinrikyo pose a unique,
counter-terrorism dilemma to the often democratic states from which they are borne. Religious
sanctuary and rights that uphold freedom of speech make such states a haven for religious
extremism. When compounded by the often tax-exempt and sheltered nature of these groups,
they can metamorphose into a different entity entirely; namely one that engages in acts of
intimidation, harassment, extortion, internecine violence, and terrorism as in the case of Aum
Shinrikyo. However, leadership decapitation's long term effects hint at some merits to its
implementation against such groups. Shoko Asahara's singular role at the top of Aum Shinrikyo,
as its creator, instigator, arbiter of acts of violence, and foremost cleric, made him an extremely
vulnerable linchpin, whose removal was a harbinger of Aum's decline from violent extremism.

Measuring Success & Effects

As Mannes and Jordan suggested, Aum Shinrikyo, as a religious-terrorist group,
experienced a surge in violent activity immediately following Asahara’s arrest130. During the
same week of Asahara’s arrest, Aum members mailed a parcel bomb to the governor of Tokyo,
whose assistant was maimed while handling it. Additionally, a hydrogen-cyanide device was
only nearly averted from detonation in Tokyo’s third busiest transport hub, Skinjuku station.
Further, the Chief of the Japanese, National Police Agency was shot and almost killed outside
of his home in Tokyo.
Although acts of retaliation by Aum members occurred in the wake of Asahara’s arrest,
the spurt of violence was short-lived, occurring only over the course of three months. The group
itself, as Jordan reluctantly iterates, ‘are seen as more likely to have charismatic leaders who
are essential to setting and maintaining organizational goals. Thus according to theories of
charismatic leadership these groups should be weakened by decapitation. Jordan appears
sceptical of the efficacy of leadership decapitation in extremist, religious groups because
removing cultish leaders – like Asahara – does not carry with it immediate results. Jordan points
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to the often ‘counterproductive’ effects of leadership decapitation in religious groups because it
can instigate violence like in the case of Aum. However, examining a longer period of time
suggests somewhat different results.

Figure 1.7 illustrates the number of incidents perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyo from the
time that the Japanese government afforded political status to the group in 1989, up to two
years following Asahara’s arrest in 1997. The data in Figure 1.7 allows for the decline in Aum’s
violent activities around the time that the group lobbied for political representation in the
Japanese House of Representatives from 1990 to 1992. Also represented in Figure 1.7 is the
sharp decline in Aum Shinrikyo incidents beginning in 1995, corresponding to Asahara’s arrest.
The number of Aum incidents ceased entirely by the end of 1996. The post-1995 decline can
also be viewed as alluding to the arrests of over one hundred Aum Shinrikyo members in the
aftermath of the Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway.
Figure 1.7 Aum Shinrikyo Incidents (1989–1997)131

years in operation

In 2000, Aum Shinrikyo renamed itself 'Aleph', disavowed any connection to prior
members who had engaged in violence and criminality, and further foreswore future acts of
terrorism. This came in part from a public outcry to petition the Japanese government's abolition
of Aum Shinrikyo and its designation as a terrorist organisation by a dozen countries. Aum
Shinrikyo is one of the only case studies in this paper that experienced all three attributable
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factors that make leadership decapitation uniquely effective at stopping terrorist activity:
younger than twenty years, hierarchically structured, and motivated exclusively by a religious
compunction.

Within the context of Aum Shinrikyo, a unique effect in this instance of leadership
decapitation centers upon Aum’s apocalyptic system of beliefs. Apocalyptic groups, such as
Aum Shinrikyo, which exist on the fringes of accepted society, often do so out of the inherent
fear that their ideology designates them both as special in possessing some knowledge
unknown to the rest of the world, necessitating isolation. This is particularly true for Aum
Shinrikyo given that the organization was founded upon the ideal that it had the duty of bringing
about the end of the world through artificial, cataclysmic destruction. The Canadian Security
Intelligence Service’s report on apocalyptic cults concluded:

Sanctions applied by authorities are often interpreted by a movement as
hostile to its existence, which reinforces their apocalyptic beliefs and leads to
further withdrawal, mobilization and deviant actions, and which in turn elicits
heavier sanctions by authorities. This unleashes a spiral of amplification, as
each action amplifies each action, and the use of violence is facilitated as the
group believes this will ultimately actualize its doomsday scenario.132

This assessment could in part account for the short-lived but intense period of violence that
followed Asahara’s arrest in 1995.
A potential typological effect of Aum’s leadership decapitation can be linked to this
‘spiral of amplification,’ wherein the removal of an extremist, religious leader from a group
whose beliefs stem from a desire to witness or precipitate the end of the world can further
insulate the group from the outside world and exponentially radicalize the group for as long as it
remains unchecked by law enforcement or governmental services. Further, in such groups
whose leader is revered as a messiah-type figure, and whose persecution or death is
considered one of a number of observable signs for the group, it can reaffirm their resolve in
their core of beliefs and ergo, spur them to further acts of violence or terrorism.
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However, this should be viewed in the same manner that astrologists and cosmologists
view supernovas – dying stars which often burn brightest and hottest before sputtering and
ultimately perishing. The continued but directionless resurgence of violence is viewed by some
researchers, like Jenna Jordan as resilience to leadership decapitation in religious groups. But I
argue that aimless acts of violence or terrorism in the wake of leadership decapitation are akin
to a passing echo, emulating the deeds of the leader who was removed from power in an effort
to continue his or her mission, but without the purpose or direction, albeit misguided, that
originally steered the organization to acts of terrorism. This supernova effect in the form of a
lack of directionality, often causes adherents to defect from the organization and divulge
information on the group to authorities which only furthers organizational collapse.
Hamas – Yahya Ayyash
The case study of Yahya Ayyash’s assassination during his membership in Hamas,
exhibits the dangers of hyper-aggressive counter-terrorism measures, particularly repression
and targeted killing. The established wealth of local support that buttressed Hamas, in addition
to the religious congruity, and shared perception of Israel as an occupying, foreign force of an
opposing religious order, meant that Hamas could endure the loss of Ayyash. Further, the
public and gruesome manner of his death resulted in an inadvertent backlash effect – according
to Audrey Cronin – that bore martyrdom, revenge squadrons, new recruits to Hamas, and
popular promises of revenge against the State of Israel.

Although not a founding member, Yahya Ayyash was the primary bomb-maker and
explosives expert for Hamas almost from the time that the organization formed its military wing
in 1991. He was considered a primary, decision-making figure among Hamas’s military branch
and was responsible for the organization, supplying of tools, and implementation of acts of
terrorism that included explosive ordnance. Ayyash had attended Birzeit University in 1987,
where he received a degree in Electrical Engineering in 1991. Ayyash had expressed his intent
to further pursue a Master's degree in Sciences at University of Jordan, but was apparently
denied doing so by Israeli authorities133. Whether this denial directly influenced Ayyash's
decision to join Hamas remains unclear but it is widely believed that he did enter the
organization at or around this time. Quickly demonstrating his electrical ingenuity, knowledge of
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ordnance, and familiarity with chemical compound reactions, Ayyash gained the moniker, 'the
Engineer' by which he later became widely known.
Ayyash first constructed bombs for Hamas in late 1992 – early 1993. Ayyash’s name
came to be known to Israeli intelligence services when, in 1995, three members of Hamas were
taken into custody by the Shin Bet. The would-be suicide bombers were arrested and upon
interrogating the men, Israeli intelligence learned the bomb-maker’s identity – Yayah Abd-alLatif Ayyash, the ‘Engineer’. The attentions of Shin Bet and the Palestinian Authority quickly
turned to Ayyash, who by late 1995 had also begun freelance construction of explosive devices
for the Islamic Jihad (IJ).
ISA (Shin Bet) learned of Ayyash’s frequent, weekend trips to Gaza City where he
regularly visited a friend from his youth. ISA members gave Ayyash’s acquaintance a
disposable, mobile phone which Israeli intelligence would use to spy on Ayyash. The ISA did
not mention that the cellular phone also contained a small amount (15–50 g) of RDX, explosive
plastique which could be remotely detonated. Knowing that Ayyash regularly borrowed his
friend’s mobile phone to make calls while in Gaza, ISA handed the mobile over to Ayyash’s
friend. On 5 January 1996, ISA learned from an intercepted phone call that Ayyash was using
the phone in the district of Beit Lahia, and remotely detonated the internal explosive, killing
Ayyash.

Age

Although founded in 1987, the Military Branch of Hamas, known as the Qassam
Brigades, was founded in 1992, and for the purposes of this paper, I will be concerned
exclusively with the latter. At twenty-three years old, the Qassam Brigades has surpassed the
two decade marker designated as a factor for organizational resilience to leadership
decapitation. It is true, in the case of Hamas, that bureaucratization to the degree that it has
disseminated through the organization, is a component to the effortlessness with which Ayyash
was replaced. Ayyash’s presence in Hamas for several years had also meant that he had the
opportunity to share his engineering, electrical, and ordnance experience to other that could
continue bomb-making in his absence134. Age has also allowed the Qassam Brigades to fine134
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tune their bomb-making skills and ability to carry out acts of suicide terrorism. The
bureaucratization afforded to Hamas by age, allowed it, on a superficial level, to establish
different branches that, in the eyes of some, lends it legitimacy.

Structure

The Qassam Brigades are rigidly, hierarchically structured like a government institution.
As a result, the command structure is well-known to many, including Israel’s Shin Bet. The
leadership of the Qassam Brigades have repeatedly been targets for leadership decapitation by
Israeli security forces since the Second Intifada. However, assassinating Hamas leadership has
had mixed, perhaps detrimental, effects on the ability of the organization to carry out acts of
terrorism. However, the hierarchical structuring of the Qassam Brigades, and the other
branches of Hamas, are self-contained. That is, the leadership of one branch possesses the
same relative authority as any leader from another branch of Hamas. As a result, the reality of
Hamas leadership is that leadership is in fact decentralized, with leadership of one branch
being responsible for the operations of their branch alone. One likely reason why the death of
Yahya Ayyash was not fatal to the Qassam Brigades was because of this factor of branchexclusive, insular leadership that had minimal crossover with other branches.

Motivation

The motivation of Hamas, is primarily nationalistic, though the core of state-building
aspirations is to possess an exclusionary, Islamic Palestine. This being said, because the
primary goal of Hamas is to secure geographic territory, a directive not pronounced because of
religious creed, but from a place of territorial ambition, that I subsume a nationalistic motive.
One cannot dispute the importance of religion in discussing the strength of popular support for
Hamas, as Islam is as much part of the Palestinian cultural heritage as its geography. The
cross-cutting cleavages of religion and nationality are driving factors in the organizational
resilience and growth of Hamas. The import of these interacting factors of state aspirations and
religion stems also from the fact that the perceived occupiers are a different religion from the
natives. Given the tumultuous, historical relationship between Jews and Muslims, it is not
remarkable that the aggregation of religion and nationalism are contentious issues, driving the
resilience of Hamas in the face of repeated decapitation attempts.
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Measuring Success & Effects

Following policy, the ISA and the IDF neither acknowledged nor denied responsibility for
the assassination of Ayyash, though it was widely reported that his death was the outcome of a
Shin Bet operation targeting the Hamas bomb-maker. Leading up to his death, Ayyash had
been at the top of the Most Wanted lists of the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, as well as the
ISA. It was reported that more than 100,000 mourners attended Ayyash’s funeral and that,
rather than deterring further acts of terrorism, the apparent assassination caused attendees of
the funeral to ‘[promise] a new Jihad, a holy war against Zionist targets, as soon as
possible…[and] to cut out Zionist tongues and cut off their hands’135. In 2010, streets in Jenin,
Jericho, Beit Lahia, and Ramallah were all named after Ayyash, petitioned and funded for by
the Palestinian Authority136.
Figure 1.8 Hamas Incidents (1992–1998)137

years in operation

Figure 1.8 indicates the number of terrorist incidents perpetrated by Hamas while Yahya
Ayyash was the chief bombmaker and coordinator, from his first known used device in 1992,
until his death in 1996, including the two, years following. Figure 1.8 controls for Hamas's use of
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explosives, ordnance, and suicide bombings exclusively as these were the medium with which
Ayyash worked.

The immediate short term effect of Ayyash's death is represented in Figure 1.8, where
the moderate drop in Hamas's employment of suicide explosions is visible after 1996. However,
as with other groups who make use of explosives and suicide attacks, the diminished number of
attacks does not accurately represent the number of fatalities that occurred per attack.
Examining terrorist attacks from 1980 to 2001, Pape found that suicide, terrorist attacks
counted for three percent of the total number of attacks, but ‘accounted for almost 48 percent of
deaths’138. The data set does however allude to Hamas's resurgent trend in suicide terrorism in
1997 and gaining in 1998.

To further illustrate this point, one need look no further than the posthumously-founded,
Disciples of the Martyr Yahya Ayyash (DOMYA) group. Between February and March of 1996,
the DOMYA, linked to Hamas, carried out four suicide bombings that targeted Israelis, killing
upwards of sixty people. Israeli intelligence gained information from one of the group
coordinators that the group and its attacks were likely a product of and in direct retaliation for
the assassination of Ayyash139. To this end, this instance of leadership decapitation has had no
productive implications for Israeli counter-terrorism in the years since as Hamas’s suicide
bombings in the 21st century are just as prolific and often more fatal. According to the Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since Ayyash’s death, there have been approximately 154 reported
suicide bombings linked to Hamas, whereas only a dozen occurred within his lifetime140.

Leadership decapitation as revenge or retaliation has proven largely ineffectual. This is
borne out in the episode of Usama bin Ladin, who, at the time of his death in 2011, had only a
minimal operational role, restricted by coalition efforts to find him. Still, his significance as chief
architect and facilitator of the 11 September 2001 attacks made him a valuable, symbolic target.
Similarly, Shin Bet's choice to assassinate rather than arrest Ayyash can best be understood as
an extrajudicial boon to propaganda for the Israeli intelligence program. Ayyash’s death also
occurred during the Second Intifada when a constant stream of successful, targeted killings of
high-value targets were proof that the Israeli counterterrorism campaign was working.
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As one of the core members of Hamas's military operations branch at the time, Ayyash
could likely have been a source of vital intelligence about the organization. In the words of an
Israeli Unit 504, Special Operator, ‘[Hamas operatives] don't necessarily have to be killed in a
battle. You can interrogate them and extract information that will help our forces in the fighting
to come’141. Ayyash was capable of divulging bomb-manufacturing techniques indicative of
Hamas, locations of safe-houses and stockpiles, names of key Hamas members and their
organizational roles, as well as Hamas's counter-intelligence methods. Although coercive
interrogation techniques are notoriously unreliable in producing actionable intelligence, IDF
officers have a reasonable track-record of getting detainees to produce qualitative
information142. Ultimately, Shin Bet and the Israeli government decided that Ayyash was better
off dead than alive. As Cronin warned, the 'backlash effect' of this kind of leadership
decapitation can often outweigh the short term benefits of target liquidation.

Discerning a typological effect of leadership decapitation in nationalistically motivated
groups, such as Ayyash and Hamas, has largely to do with the concern for ‘backlash’ effect,
amplified by religious and cultural norms that laude violent deaths in pursuit of both religious
and nationalistic goals. Nationalistically motivated, terrorist groups that experience leadership
decapitation are less likely to degrade or disband when both religion and statehood are factors
at stake. To demonstrate this point, Ganor states in The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle,

Terrorist [organizations are] usually composed of a group of people infused
with an extreme ideology or religious belief, or a combination of the two, who
are faithful to their goal and prepared to sacrifice personal and common
resources, their personal well-being and on occasion, even their lives, in
order to attain their goal. 143

Robert Pape further suggests that cross-cutting cleavages between occupier and native can
exacerbate the likelihood for the native population to resort to suicide terrorism as a means to

141

Shalom, Oded. "Human Intelligence under Fire." YNet. Yedioth, 26 Sept. 2014. Web. 17 Sept. 2015.
Rumney, Philip. "The Effectiveness of Coercive Interrogation: Scholarly and Judicial Responses." Crime, Law
and Social Change 44 (2006): 465-89. Print., Bell, Jeannine. ""Behind This Mortal Bone": The (In)Effectiveness of
Torture." Indiana Law Journal 83.1 (2008): 339-61. Print.
142

143

Ganor, Boaz, and Israel Hertseliyah. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle. p. 65.

70

achieve sovereignty. In the case of Hamas, Pape dismisses the cleavage of religious faith as
being the primary factor. Rather, when religion and nationality are aggregated as cross-cutting
cleavages, the likelihood that the native population will incorporate suicide terrorism into its
struggle for national sovereignty grows exponentially144.

Conclusion

The implementation of leadership decapitation as a counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency policy is unlikely to cease altogether for the states and agencies that currently make
use of it. However, this paper has suggested some typological effects that can be expected in
the aftermath of leadership decapitation so as to better understand the probable ramifications of
targeting terrorist leadership. The question still remains – Is leadership decapitation an effective
strategy? Even in certain circumstances, can decapitation bring about the degradation or
dissolution of a terrorist organization? This paper has argued that while the overall efficacy of
leadership decapitation as a strategy remains in question, the age, structure, and motivation of
groups have likely, typological effects that can be observed from the empirical cases examined
and the data that supports them.

Making pronouncements about the efficacy of leadership decapitation on the part of
scholarship would still be premature, as the definitions of ‘targeted killing’ and ‘leadership
decapitation’ are, themselves surrounded with legal and moral uncertainty. However, this paper
can offer some conclusions from the research conducted thus far as to the expectations of
leadership decapitation under a specific set of circumstances and typological effects that follow.

First, the likely dissolution of a terrorist organization from decapitation of its leadership
can often be determined by its age. The longevity of terrorist organization is generally
dependent upon whether it has existed for longer than approximately twenty years. While the
twenty-year benchmark has not been conclusively proven as determinant of a terrorist group’s
collapse from leadership decapitation, this paper has suggested and provided evidence that it is
far less probable.
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Longevity carries with it the added benefits of entrenchment, resource consolidation or
distribution, recruitment, naming of successors, and establishment of all-important nodes of
communication wherefrom acts of terrorism can be carried out, as demonstrated by the cases
of al-Qa’ida and the Tamil Tigers, for example. In the case of al-Qa’ida, the age of the
organization provided it with established nodes of communication from which it could call on
operatives and resources from any number of countries with which it had affiliates. Advanced
age also allowed al-Qa’ida to determine new means of circumventing counter-terrorism
measures meant to undermine it through consolidating authority and establishing a clear path of
succession by way of hierarchical structuring. Financial stability was yet another key facet of the
organizational durability afforded to al-Qa’ida by its age. The totality of these attributes
ultimately meant that when Usama bin Ladin was eventually killed, the group had contingencies
in place for the organization to carry on in his absence, the least of which was an immediate
successor in al-Zawahiri.
Similarly, the LTTE’s advanced age, allowed it to support itself monetarily, while
organizing a massive resistance to government counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency
methods. Although ultimately halted by all-out repressive counter-measures, the LTTE was able
to mount a formidable force of fighters, suicide bombers, as well as air and sea operatives who
terrorized Sri Lankan civilians, police, and military alike for decades. The LTTE, too had an
established hierarchy, not dissimilar to al-Qa’ida’s, with stated leadership and would-be
successors. Local and international funding was also afforded consistently to the group through
prior nodes of communication. The 2009 incursion into the LTTE territory was likely the only
means of dismantling the group in a time-efficient manner because of the organizational
resilience factor.
The aforementioned factors dramatically increase a terrorist organization’s ability to
perpetrate clandestine acts of terrorism while simultaneously surviving the death or arrest of
their leader or leaders. Younger groups are particularly vulnerable to leadership decapitation for
the same reasons listed above, with some notable additions. Terrorist groups that are
temporally young, also face the tumult of internal distrust, securing safe areas from where to
train and operate, acquiring materiel support without drawing the unwanted attention of counterterrorism agencies, and the general atmosphere of inexperience which can obscure critical
judgment and impair the capacity to get operations off of the ground, as I mentioned in the case
of Shining Path.
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In the case of Shining Path, the inexperience of the group as a militant insurgency
worked against it. The inherent distrust of others to lead his organization led Guzman to not
seek out a successor to the group, even as he faced capture or death. The general atmosphere
of inexperience coupled with Guzman’s cult of personality prevented Shining Path from putting
into effect contingencies in the event of leadership decapitation. The group had not been
resourceful in securing funds, criminally or legally, and was also unable to fund further acts of
violence, had it wanted to, after Guzman ordered his members to surrender.

Second, the internal structure, or lack thereof, of terrorist organizations is a likely
determining factor in whether or not such a group can survive the loss of leadership. Groups
that are engendered from extreme, political institutions generally retain the structure of the initial
political faction. Given the bureaucratized and hierarchical nature of such groups, the evidence
suggests that leadership decapitation in these groups is likely to be successful because of the
reliance on the leader for operational direction, vision, and maintaining high morale, as in the
case of the PKK.

Ocalan and the PKK illustrate the relative ease with which some terrorist groups are
dismantled who rely strongly on a single leadership figure to provide the overall direction and
motivation to commit acts of terror. Ocalan, whose violent rhetoric coupled with a vision for
Kurdish society, made him a fine leader for the PKK and rousing figure behind whom men and
women would rally, even in the name of violence. However, the risk a leader runs by
consolidating authority is providing his or her enemies a singular figure who can be targeted for
removal. This was precisely the case with the PKK. When Ocalan was arrested in Kenya, the
organization was gutted by the loss of vision and direction that not only gave an impetus for
acts of terrorism, but also directed them. Ocalan, as leader of the PKK further served to
galvanize support among disparate groups of Kurds. The factor of a charismatic leader,
otherwise unique in this manner, also made Ocalan a prime target for the leadership
decapitation which ultimately weakened his organization.
Similarly, because hierarchically structured groups often emerge from legal institutions –
such as parliamentary or congressional parties, ethnic representation groups, faith-based,
goodwill organizations, etc. – governments that deal with such leaders as criminals and pursue
arrest rather than targeted killing as a means of leadership decapitation have a longer lasting

73

effect on the integrity of the group itself. Portraying leaders of terrorist organizations, that are
hierarchically structured, as criminals subject to the rule of law has proven more successful in
preventing further acts of violence.

Terrorist organizations with a more horizontal or diffuse leadership structure appear
more adept at surviving leadership decapitation, as in the case of the Caucasus Emirate. This
can be attributed most strongly to the recognized dispensable nature of the leadership figure as
either replaceable, symbolic, or not necessary to the implementation of terrorist operations.
When this is the case, leadership decapitation rarely appears to slow the growth or capacity of
the larger organization which is likely to hail the former leader as a martyr to the cause and
galvanize new leadership to further acts of terror.

The CE has arguable survived more episodes and attempts of leadership decapitation
than any terrorist organization in modern history. The group persists in large part because of
diffuse leadership system which allows differing regional chapters to be governed by leaders
who best embody their regional concerns and who can most effectively muster resources to
assail Russian targets. Without the consolidation of authority, the CE was able to command
popular support over a tremendous, geographical territory. While one or more CE leaders are
killed every year, there are no shortage of replacements for them, due in part to the group’s
roots in two Chechen wars, but hardened by repeated incursions by Russian counter-terror
forces. Remarkably, in spite of repressive tactics, the CE has survived, arguably as strong as it
ever was. The constant presence of leadership allows for the continual formation and
implementation of acts of terrorism without a prerequisite pause for fear of leadership
decapitation as an existential threat.

Third, terrorist groups whose primary, existential function is derived from religion or
ideology are particularly violent in their behavior, viewing the remainder of humanity either as
an impediment to the group’s goals or threatening the group itself. However, these groups are
also vulnerable to leadership decapitation because of their hermitical nature and reliance on
their leadership for ideological guidance, as illustrated by the Aum Shinrikyo case study.
Leadership in religiously motivated groups is often a struggle to maintain absolute power
through coercion while simultaneously seeking some larger goal by which the only apparent
means is terrorism. Thus, leaders are in a constant state of paranoia from endogenous and
exogenous shocks that may disrupt their grip on authority. Removing leaders in these types of
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terrorist organizations can often cause members to come to the forefront about the group’s
activities and serve the effort in minimizing a potential backlash effect from the leader’s
removal.

Aum Shinrikyo, at the time of the 1995, Sarin gas attack had an estimated membership
of between 800 and 1,500 members, rivalling many, more durable terrorist organizations like
Abu Sayyaf with an estimated membership of between 200 and 500. Large numbers of
members, however, appear to be more a result of the draw of the message of Aum under
Asahara. By virtue of this, the religious vision of the group, which ultimately drove it to acts of
violence, is the primary compunction for its acts of terror. Once Asahara was arrested, the
group began an erratic, spree of violence. However, this was both aimless, and short-lived.
Without Asahara, the primary voice driving and rationalizing acts of terrorism was by and large
silenced. To remove Asahara was to remove the rationale for Aum Shinrikyo as a religion,
without which the group could not continue to carry out the apocalyptic vision of its creator.

Terrorist groups that have a nationalistic basis for their activities are likely more resilient
to leadership decapitation, particularly if they are part of a larger contingent that views
themselves as natives repelling an occupying, alien force, which was portrayed in the case of
Hamas. Further, when cross-cutting cleavages like ethnic homogeneity and religion are
considerations, employing acts of terrorism – especially suicide terrorism – to achieve
geographical autonomy become more plausible.

Because the cause is arguably shared by an entire population, it would be unreasonable
to believe that removing a leader would have a deleterious effect on groups that utilize terrorism
for these ends. Still, Ganor suggests that arresting members from this sort of group and using
them for counterintelligence purposes has yielded some success in preventing particular
terrorism plots145. If leadership decapitation policies are implemented in combatting this
typology of terrorist organization, there is likely to be a backlash effect in retaliation as well as a
general surge in violence and recruitment to the cause.
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Policy Implications

One of the more salient issues not widely discussed in this paper is the ethical dilemma
implicit in the use of targeted arrests or more broadly, targeted killings. Under the auspices of
counter-terrorism, most states appear ready to resort to targeted killing, and can usually sustain
doing so with pseudo-legality. Presupposing that utilizing targeted killing or arrest vis-a-vis a
method of leadership decapitation is efficacious, state governments and their respective
institutions should also consider the ramifications for international, diplomatic relations as well
as the perception of being in compliance with international humanitarian law. The backlash
effect mentioned in this paper, attributed to Audrey Cronin, is not limited to a violent response
from targeted terrorist groups. More developed states can threaten trade restrictions or even
the cessation of diplomatic relations if leadership decapitation practices interfere with state
sovereignty. Ultimately, the policy of leadership decapitation – in both of the forms mentioned in
this paper – should come under judicial and Congressional review – specifically within the
United States – before determining who is to be targeted or what legal basis there is to do so,
rather than in hindsight.
Leadership decapitation should not be considered a ‘silver bullet’ solution to
counterterrorism. Scholarship has hardly come to a consensus on the success of its usage, let
alone its short-term and long-term implications for the terrorist groups at which the policy is
aimed. In lieu of a moratorium on the policy itself, states should reconsider the issuing of ‘kill
orders’ on Most Wanted lists, which further the notion that the death of an organization’s leader
or leaders will ultimately be beneficial to a law enforcement or counterterrorism effort. Rather,
leadership decapitation is best applied when in conjunction with other counter-terrorism
measures. As such, the process and implementation of leadership decapitation requires further
investigation and review given its proliferation among state, counterterrorism agencies, and
militaries.

Should a state still avail itself of leadership decapitation operations going forward, then
its military and counterterrorism agencies should be mindful of the typological effects suggested
by this paper. Not every terrorist organization is the same, nor do particular terrorist
organizations remain the same in their structure or operations. However, considering the age,
structure, and motivation of the terrorist organization in question can elucidate whether a policy
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of leadership decapitation is likely to consequently degrade or collapse it or prove altogether
counterproductive.
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